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INTRODUCTION
The history of federal concern for air pollution has been like
that of a new volcano: brief but dramatic. As recently as 1960 all
regulation was conducted at state and local levels; today, by far the
dominant presence is federal.
Congress made its first tentative foray into the field with the
Air Pollution Control Act of 1955,1 which cast the federal govern-
ment in a purely informational role. The 1963 Clean Air Act 2
added federal grants to support state and local control agencies,
authorized the negotiation of interstate compacts, and stuck a small
toe in the door of federal enforcement by establishing a cumber-
some "conference" procedure that theoretically might result in a
federal suit to abate pollution. Authority was given in 1965 to
establish national emission standards for new vehicles,3 and in 1967
to review and ultimately to enforce state-submitted standards of
ambient air quality.4 Additional sweeping powers were granted to
the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970 5 and
1977.6
The product of these legislative avulsions is an enormously
intricate statute that begins to rival in complexity the Internal
Revenue Code: it consumes 164 pages, without case annotations, of
the United States Code Annotated. The statute itself has been
subject to massive administrative and judicial accretions. More-
over, this law is of great practical importance, is all quite new, and
is very little known. It also raises innumerable interesting prob-
lems both of interpretation and of policy.
This Article is one of a series exploring the various provisions
of this law as it has developed and as it stands today.7 One of my
IAct of July 14, 1955, Pub. L. No. 84-159, 69 Stat. 322 (1955).
2 Clean Air Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963).
3 Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Act, Pub. L. No. 89-272, 79 Stat. 992
(1965).
4 Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485 (1967).
S Clean Air Amendments of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970)
(codified in scattered sections of 42, 49, 50 U.S.C.).
6 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codi-
fied in scattered sections of 15, 42 U.S.C.).
7 Currie, Motor Vehicle Air Pollution: Federal Pre-emption, 68 MiCH. L. 1Ev.
1083 (1970); Currie, Federal Air-Quality Standards and Their Implementation,
1976 Am. B.F. IREs. J. 365 [hereinafter cited as Federal Air-Quality Standards];
Currie, Judicial Review Under Federal Pollution Laws, 62 IowA L. IEv. 1221
(1977); Currie, The Mobile-Source Provisions of the Clean Air Act, 46 U. Cm. L.
1tEv. 811 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Mobile-Source Provisions]; Currie, Non-
degradation and Visibility Under the Clean Air Act, 68 CArIF. L. REv. 48 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Nondegradation]; Currie, Relaxation of Implementation Plans
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aims is to provide a roadmap for those who must traverse this
mysterious terrain. Another is to supply critical commentary, after
the ineradicable fashion of law professors, in the hope that the
next generation of legislative, administrative, and judicial decisions
may benefit from the experience of the past.
My present subject is the sections of the Clean Air Act that
provide for direct federal control of air pollution from stationary
sources. Even today section 101(a)(3) piously, if disingenuously,
declares that "the prevention and control of air pollution at its
source is the primary responsibility of States and local govern-
ments." 8 The central mechanism for control of stationary sources
remains the plan for implementing air-quality standards under
section 110, which is developed by the states subject to exacting
federal review.9 As early as 1970, however, Congress enacted two
provisions for direct regulation of emissions from stationary sources.
Section 111 authorizes federal "standards of performance" for "new"
stationary sources and, subject to certain limitations, for existing
sources of a type for which federal new-source standards have been
adopted; ' section 112 authorizes "emission standards" for "hazard-
ous" air pollutants.1 The 1977 amendments added authority to
adopt regulations to prevent potentially harmful effects on the
stratosphere. 2 Finally, since 1977 the statute has authorized emer-
gency federal action to protect against "imminent and substantial
endangerment to the health of persons." 13
The aggregate of these provisions is a very broad range of direct
federal regulatory authority, subject to a number of restrictions that
give rise to the predictable abundance of interpretive difficulties.
I shall examine each provision in some detail.
I. NEW-SOURCE PERFPoRmANCE STANDARDS
A. "New" Sources
The main focus of section 111 is on "new pollution prob-
lems," 14 and the basic grant of authority in section 111(b) is to
Under the 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments, 78 MICH. L. BEv. 201 (1980 [herein-
after cited as Relaxation of Implementation Plans].
842 U.S.C. §7401(a)(3) (Supp. II 1978).
9 1d. §7410.
'ld. § 7411.
"id. § 7412.
12 Id. §§ 7450-7459.
131d. §7603(a).
IS. BEP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1970). Accord, H.R. Rep. No.
1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1970).
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adopt performance standards for "new sources." 16 A new source
is defined in section 111(a)(2) as "any stationary source, the con-
struction or modification of which is commenced after the publica-
don of regulations (or, if earlier, proposed regulations) prescribing
a standard of performance under this section which will be ap-
plicable to such source." :6 Despite this effort at definition, the
distinction between a new source and an old one has proved sur-
prisingly elusive.
1. The Relevant Date
The statute's choice of the date when standards are adopted is
an obvious point at which to draw the line. Although any source
beginning operation after the enactment of the statutory provision
causes the "new pollution problem" section 111 was meant to pre-
vent, sources built before the standards are announced might re-
quire extensive modification if they were to comply. One of the
justifications for imposing separate standards on new sources, as the
House Report explained in 1977, is that it is generally more ex-
pensive to install control equipment in an existing plant than in a
new one: "testimony . . . indicates that it costs about 25 percent
less to purchase and install flue gas desulfurization technology on a
new plant than it would cost to retrofit that plant subsequently." 17
The statutory decision not to apply regulations retroactively seems
to be a sensible concession to this fact of life.
In pushing the date back to when the standards are proposed
the statute apparently is meant to preclude the proposal from pre-
cipitating a rush to begin construction in order to avoid the stand-
ards. Unfairness is reduced by the fact that the proposal gives
warning that a regulation is on the way, and some hint of its pos-
sible content. Yet if the final standard departs from the proposal,
anyone who began construction in the interim may have to backfit,
and this prospect may induce some to postpone construction until
the regulation is adopted. Congress seems to have made a reason-
able choice between two imperfect solutions.1 s
1542 U.S.C. §7411(b)(1)(B) (Supp. 11 1978).
16Id. § 7411(a)(2).
17 H.R. REp. No. 294, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 185, reprinted in [1977] U.S.
CODE CoNG. & AD. N-uws 1264.
Is The comparable provision of the water-pollution statute, 33 U.S.C. § 1316
(a)(2) (1976), specifies that the proposal date is determinative only "if such
standard is thereafter promulgated." This is implicit in the air-pollution provision
as well.
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2. The Commencement of Construction
The decisive event in determining whether a source is "new"
is the "commence[ment]" of "construction or modification." 'o In
the absence of guidance from either the statute or the committee
reports, the EPA adopted a regulation defining "construction" as
"fabrication, erection, or installation of an affected facility," 20 and
providing that construction or modification has "commenced" when
the owner "has undertaken a continuous program of construction
or modification or . . .has entered into a contractual obligation to
undertake and complete, within a reasonable time, a continuous
program of construction or modification." 21
a. Planning
This definition rejected the notion that "construction" is "com-
menced" the minute planning for construction begins. In United
States v. City of PaineVille,22 for example, the city had hired a con-
sultant in 1966 to explore the possibility of constructing a new
electrical generating unit. Construction was authorized in 1967,
ancillary equipment was purchased as early as 1967, and a proposed
design of the generating unit itself was submitted in 1969. Never-
theless the court, upon the proposal of federal standards in 1971,
held the plant a "new" source: "Construction" had not "com-
menced" before "a contract for the purchase of a new boiler was
signed" in 1972.23 The court's explanation of the basis for the
EPA's regulation was entirely consonant with the apparent statutory
purpose:
Construction of Unit 5 had not progressed to the point
that a change in its design would have required the facility
already erected to be modified in order to insure that it
could comply . . . .Painesville could have modified its
plans for Unit 5 at a time well after the proposed regula-
tions for new stationary sources became final, without loss
of the money previously spent on capital purchases. 24
"This interpretation," the court added, "is given credence by Con-
gress' use of the word 'construction' . . . rather than the words
'planning' or 'designing.' 25
19 U.S.C. § 7411(a)(2) (Supp. II 1978).
2040 C.F.R. § 60.2(g) (1979).
21 id. § 60.2(i).
22431 F. Supp. 496 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
23 Id. 500.
24Id. 501 (footnote omitted).
25 Id. 501 n.8.
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To be sure, some investment in planning may be wasted under
the EPA's definition,26 but the long planning period in Painesville
is evidence that the alternative is a substantial increase in the
number of sources exempt from section 111 regulation. It seems
reasonable for the EPA to conclude that planning expenses are not
sufficiently great, in light of section 11 I's policy of limiting increased
pollution, to justify construing "commence[ment]" of "construc-
tion" to include planning. And while in isolation the phrase
"program of construction" in the regulation might be taken to em-
brace the planning process, the additional reference to "contractual
obligation" would be superfluous given such an interpretation, and
therefore seems to limit the "program" to actual physical con-
struction.
b. Contracting
On the other hand, the EPA's interpretation clearly made a
"contractual obligation" to construct sufficient to trigger section 111,
although until physical construction begins "a change in .
design" would not, in the words of the Painesville opinion, "have
required the facility already erected to be modified." 27 Yet by
signing a contract the owner may incur an obligation to another
party that would subject him to significant detriment if subsequent
standards required modification, and looking to the contract date
may simplify questions of proof. Thus the line drawn again seemed
a reasonable balance of the competing concerns underlying the
limitation of section 111 to "new" sources. The statutory terms
seemed flexible enough to permit this because, in one sense, even
planning can be described as part of the process of "construction." 2S
Despite this, the EPA had second thoughts about the propriety
of an absolute rule based on the existence of a contract, and inter-
preted an identical regulation defining new sources for purposes of
the nondegradation requirement 29 to make a contract decisive only
when its cancellation would result in substantial cost. Not surpris-
26As argued in Montana Power Co. v. EPA, 429 F. Supp. 683, 701 (D. Mont.
1977).
27431 F. Supp. at 501.
28The EPA's equation of contracting with construction was subsequently
adopted by Congress in the comparable new-source provision of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act:
"'[clonstruction' means any placement, assembly, or installation of facili-
ties or equipment (including contractual obligations to purchase such
facilities or equipment) at the premises where such equipment will be
used...." 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(5) (1976).
2940 C.F.R. §52.21(b)(8)(ii) (1979).
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ingly, a district court found the Agency had misread its own regula-
tions.30 In 1977 Congress adopted the EPA's rejected definition for
purposes of nondegradation:
[T]he term "commenced" as applied to construction of a
major emitting facility means that the owner or operator
has obtained all necessary preconstruction approvals or
permits required by Federal, State, or local air pollution
emissions and air quality laws or regulations and either
has (i) begun, or caused to begin, a continuous construc-
tion of physical on-site construction of the facility or (ii)
entered into binding agreements or contractual obliga-
tions, which cannot be cancelled or modified without
substantial loss to the owner or operator, to undertake a
program of construction of the facility to be completed
within a reasonable time.31
Predictably, the EPA has taken steps to conform its section 111
definition to this new statutory standard.32
c. Site Preparation and Ancillary Equipment
The EPA defines construction as the fabrication, erection, or
installation of an "affected facility," which in turn is defined as
"any apparatus to which a standard is applicable." 33 The ap-
paratus subject to the standard in the Painesville34 case was a
fossil fuel-fired steam generating unit," which was defined to mean
a "furnace or boiler." 3 5 Consequently the construction of ancillary
equipment-not subject to any standard-was immaterial. Similarly,
this definition excludes the purchase of land, the excavation of a
30 Montana Power Co. v. EPA, 429 F. Supp. at 700-01. The court of appeals
later reversed, 608 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1979).
3142 U.S.C. §7479(2)(A) (Supp. H 1978) (emphasis added). The House
Report specifically noted that this definition was intended to disapprove the district
court's Montana decision, see text accompanying note 30 supra. H.R. REP. No.
294, supra note 17, at 319, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws
at 1398. For interpretation of the new requirement that all permits be obtained,
see Montana Power Co. v. EPA, 608 F.2d 334 (9th Cir. 1979), holding a source
"new" because of failure to obtain a state air-pollution-control permit.
32See 44 Fed. Beg. 31,596 (1979), proposing a revised 40 C.F.R. § 60.2 and
quoting Congressman Rodgers that "[ilt is also expected that the Agency will act
as soon as possible to revise its new source performance standards and the defini-
tion of 'commenced construction' for the purposes of those revised standards to
conform to the definition contained in part C," (which is that quoted in the
text).
3340 C.F.R. § 60.2(g), (e) (1979).
34431 F. Supp. 496 (N.D. Ohio 1977). See text accompanying note 22
supra.
35 40 C.F.B. 9§§60.40(a)(1), 60.41(a) (1979).
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building site, and even the completion of a building in which to
house the boiler. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act takes
the opposite tack, though it does not reach land acquisition:
"'[C]onstruction' means any placement, assembly, or installation of
facilities or equipment . . . at the premises where such equipment
will be used, including preparation work at such premises." 36
One suspects that sometimes, but by no means always, standards
published after such preparatory work will necessitate modification
of physical facilities already constructed. Since a case-by-case de-
termination of the degree of hardship would be costly, either defini-
tion seems within the bounds of reasonable agency interpretation.
3. Modification
The Clean Air Act expressly defines a "new" source to in-
clude one whose "modification" begins after the specified date.31
The water-pollution statute contains no such provision.38 A "modi-
fication" within the meaning of section 111 occurs only when an
alteration of existing facilities "increases the amount of any air
pollutant emitted" or "results in the emission of any air pollutant
not previously emitted." 39 The inclusion of such modifications
follows from the statutory focus on preventing new pollution prob-
lems.40 It seems to represent, however, compromise of the com-
peting statutory policy of avoiding the extra cost of backfitting,
because the modification of a facility in other respects does not
guarantee that retrofit control costs will not be excessive. The
statutory definition exacerbates this difficulty, for "modification"
includes not only "physical change" but also "change in the method
of operation," 41 and a mere change in operation seems to hold
little promise of reducing backfit costs. Apparently in response
to this concern, but in evident contradiction to the statute, the
Agency has provided that increases in either the production rate
or hours of operation do not constitute "modifications," if the
increase in production "can be accomplished without a capital
expenditure." 42
3633 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(5) (1976).
3742 U.S.C. §7411(a)(2) (Supp. II 1978).
3833 U.S.C. 1316(a)(2) (1976).
3942 U.S.C. §7411(a)(4) (Supp. H 1978).
40 See note 14 supra.
4142 U.S.C. §7411(a)(4) (Supp. II 1978).
4240 C.F.R. §60.14(e)(2), (3) (1979).
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4. The "Bubble Concept"
While every "new source" is subject to section 111 standards,
as noted above, a "modification" is included within section 111
only if it "increases the amount of any pollutant emitted" or "re-
sults in the emission of any air pollutant.., not previously emitted"
by the modified "source." In two common situations, therefore,
the applicability of new-source standards depends upon whether the
statutory term "source" is construed to refer to an entire plant or
to each separate machine within it. First, if a new machine is
itself a "source," it must meet the standards in all cases, while if
the plant is the "source," the new machine constitutes a "modifica-
tion," and the standards are inapplicable if its emissions are offset
by the retirement of an old machine. Similarly, when a single ma-
chine is modified, emission reductions from the retirement of other
machines may be offset in determining whether there has been
an increase in emissions only if "source" is defined to include more
than the single machine.
Industry accordingly put up a vigorous fight for a broad defini-
tion that became known as the "bubble concept"; a "source" was
an entire plant, and offsets should be allowed both for the installa-
tion of new machines and the modification of existing ones. The
statute itself is of little help, defining a "stationary source" as "any
building, structure, facility, or installation which emits . . . any
air pollutant." 4 3  "Building" suggests that some sources may be
entire plants, at least if the EPA chooses to set standards on that
basis, but "facility" is an ambiguous term that could relate either
to an entire plant or to an individual machine. The Senate Com-
mittee did list entire plants such as "kraft pulp mills, petroleum
refineries, [and] steel mills" as "major new facilities" that should
be subjected to new-source standards," but the context reveals
that its concern was to suggest the types of activities that should
be regulated, not to resolve the unforeseen question whether a new
machine in an old plant was a "new source" or a "modification."
There is no evidence that Congress meant to do any more in the
statutory definition.
Some of the EPA's standards apply to individual machines,
and the regulations define an "affected facility" as "any apparatus
to which a standard is applicable." 45 The EPA yielded in part
4342 U.S.C. §7411(a)(3) (Supp. II 1978).
44 S. REP. No. 1196 supra note 14, at 16.
45 40 C.F.R. § 60.2(e) (1979).
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to industry insistence, however, and amended its definition of a
"stationary source" to mean "any building, structure, facility, or
installation . . . which contains any one or combination of . . .
[a]ffected [or other] facilities." 46 The full import of this lay in
the further provision that "a modification shall not be deemed to
occur if an existing facility undergoes a physical or operational
change where.., the total emission rate.., has not increased from
all facilities within the stationary source." 1-
The key to understanding this mouthful is the sharp distinc-
tion that the regulations drew between a "source" and a "facility."
On the one hand, when a "facility" (machine) was modified, the
new-source standards would apply only if emissions from the entire
"source" (plant) were increased. On the other hand, when an
entirely new "facility" was constructed, the standards applied
whether or not total emissions from the "source" were increased,
because no existing "facility" had undergone a physical or opera-
tional change. Thus the Agency's position was that reductions
elsewhere in the plant could be offset if an existing machine were
modified, but not if a new one were constructed.48
Solomonic solutions, if actually executed, seldom please any-
body. The EPA's halfway acceptance of the bubble concept was
challenged both by industry and by the Sierra Club, and the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit, in Asarco, Inc. v. EPA, burst the bubble
altogether: "the Act defines a 'source' as an individual facility, as
distinguished from a combination of facilities such as a plant. ... ,, 49
The regulation allowing limited offset was held invalid.50 The
Agency's inept drafting was an invitation to this reversal. The
court simply had to compare the statutory and administrative defini-
tions: "The statute defines a stationary source as any . . . facility.
. . . In contrast, the new regulations define stationary source to
include any ... combination of ... facilities .... The agency has
no authority to rewrite the statute in this fashion." 51
461d. § 60.2(d)(1).
471d. § 60.14(d).
48 See Asarco, Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319, 325 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
49 Id.
50 Belatedly, the EPA rescinded the offending provisions, declaring that "the
term 'stationary source' will hereafter have the same meaning as in the Act." 45
Fed. Beg. 5,616 (1980).
51 Asarco, 578 F.2d at 326-27. Equally devastating was the fact that EPA's
sole reason for not rejecting the bubble concept entirely was "strong opposition
from the smelting industry and the Department of Commerce.' Id. 328 n.30.
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Despite the majority's argument that a broad definition of
"source" that would allow offsets was inconsistent with the statute's
purpose to "enhance the quality of the Nation's air resources," r2
it would have been hasty to conclude that Asarco meant to forbid
offset under a more carefully drafted regulation. The court in
another passage made quite clear that it did not mean to require the
Agency to define a "facility" or "source" as a single piece of equip-
ment in every case; accepting the EPA definition of a "facility," 53
which it said was "designed to designate as 'facilities' those units of
equipment-be they individual machines, combinations of machines,
or even entire plants-that the agency finds to be appropriate units
for separate emission standards," the opinion declared that "this
court would not remove this appropriate exercise of the agency's
discretion." 5-
A later decision by the same court, setting aside Agency offset
regulations adopted under the provisions for prevention of sig-
nicant deterioration, 5 confirms this narrow interpretation of Asarco.
In Alabama Power Co. v. Costle,56 the court, condemning a provi-
sion identical to that condemned in Asarco, went on to disapprove a
provision disallowing offset for "emission reduction achieved else-
where at the source," on the basis that section 111 defines a modi-
fication as a change increasing emissions from the "source" as a
whole. Once again the problem was seen as one of drafting: the
EPA had discretion to determine the offset issue by deciding
whether or not to define an entire plant as a "facility." 57
The court has declined to resolve, then, the crucial question
whether each machine is a separate "facility" or "source." More-
over, the suggestion of the Asarco majority that any offset may
conflict with statutory policy 58 seems unconvincing. The materials
cited in the opinion do not establish that enhancement of existing
air quality was a purpose of section 111 itself; according to the
Senate Report, the purpose was "the elimination of new pollution
problems." 59
5242 U.S.C. §7401(b)(1) (Supp. II 1978).
53 See text accompanying note 45 supra.
54 578 F.2d at 324 n.17.
55 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7479 (Supp. II 1978).
56606 F.2d 1068 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
67606 F.2d at 1077, 1081-82.
5 8 See text accompanying note 52 supra.
59 S. BEP. No. 1196, supra note 14, at 16. Moreover, even if improvement
were an additional goal, that does not tell us that there must be improvement
every time new emissions are offset by reductions in the same plant. The dis-
senting judge in Asarco, 578 F.2d at 333-34, relied on the statutory definition of
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The EPA argued that its attempt to allow offset when a machine
is modified, but not when it is built, was justified by the added costs
of backfitting existing facilities.6 0 While every new machine can
reasonably be made to comply at the outset, the argument would
run, only when a modification threatens to worsen existing pollu-
tion is there adequate justification for imposing the extraordinary
costs of backfitting; arguably that is why Congress made the new-
source standards applicably only to those modifications which in-
crease emissions. The insuperable obstacle to this reasoning is
the court's observation that the EPA's position inconsistently de-
fines the statutory term "source". "one way (as an entire plant)
when determining whether a 'source' has been 'modified' and an-
other way (as an individual facility) when determining whether
a 'source' has been newly constructed." 61
The EPA's argument can be taken a step further. The de-
clared statutory purpose of section 111 was to avoid "new pollution
problems." 62 This, rather than the costs of backfitting, may ex-
plain the decision to exempt from section I l's definition of "new
source" "modifications" which do not increase emissions.63 It would
be consistent with this statutory policy to apply the new-source
standards, as industry vainly argued to the EPA, only when the
net effect of changes within a plant is to increase its total emis-
sions. This argument leads to the consistent interpretation ot
"source" to embrace an entire plant.
The trouble with this latter argument was pointed out in a
footnote to the Asarco opinion: "If an entire plant were con-
sistently defined as a single stationary source, the whole plant would
become subject to NSPSs whenever any alterations in the plant,
e.g., addition of a new facility, caused a net increase in the emission
of any pollutant from the plant." 4 The adoption of this inter-
pretation might well discourage plant expansion by requiring ex-
tensive backfitting of equipment that is not itself otherwise modi-
fied.65 It seems unlikely that Congress intended such a result, and
a "facility," which, as I have said, seems entirely ambiguous. See text accompany-
ing notes 43-44 supra.
60 See 578 F.2d at 328.
1, Id.
62See note 14 supra.
6 3 Every new source, absent offset, increases emissions; many modifications do
not.
64578 F.2d at 329 n.39.
6 5 An operator could avoid backfitting the whole plant with best available
technology if, by using offsets, he could avoid a net increase in emissions, but this
might not always be practicable.
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the EPA regulations had sought to avoid it: "The addition of an
affected facility to a stationary source . . . shall not by itself bring
within the applicability of this part any other facility within that
source." 6
The net result of the foregoing analysis is that the adverse
backfitting consequences of a broad definition of "source" seem
destined to preclude the EPA from allowing any offsets. This
state of affairs illustrates the unfortunate risks attendant upon
utilizing a single term, "source," to govern a number of disparate
questions. Whether an offset policy for either modification or
new construction is justified, or whether the Agency ought to be
authorized to reach that conclusion, is a question Congress might
consider when it next comes to amend the statute. More gen-
erally, the offset controversy is humbling proof of the difficulties
of working out the details of an ostensibly simple policy decision,
such as the distinction between "new" and "existing" sources, and
of the desirability of giving the Agency discretion to do so.
B. Other Threshold Requirements
Section 111(b) requires the Administrator to adopt "[flederal
standards of performance" for every "category" of "new" "sta-
tionary sources" which "in his judgment ... causes, or contributes
significantly to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated
to endanger public health or welfare." 67 The last clause, dating
from 1977, is almost identical to the clause inserted in section
211(c), regulating the content of fuels,68 which approved the risk-
assessment approach to determining "danger" adopted in Ethyl
Corp. v. EPA.69 As I have indicated elsewhere, this phrasing allows
the Administrator to take precautionary action without waiting for
harmful effects to occur.70
1. Significant Contribution
The only important difference between section 11I (b) and
section 211 (c) in this respect is that section 111 adds the word
"significantly" to the requirement that the category of sources to
be regulated contribute to dangerous air pollution. The evident
intention, though the committee reports do not mention it, was
6640 C.F.R. § 60.14(c) (1979).
6742 U.S.C. §7411(b)(1)(A), (B) (Supp. II 1978).
6842 U.S.C. §7545(c)(1) (Supp. II 1978).
69541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
7o See Mobile-Source Provisions, supra note 7, at 885-90.
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to avoid federal regulation of trivial sources. Thus the EPA,
while concluding that "all sources" of particulate matter "contri-
buted to the endangerment of public health or welfare," considered
a number of factors in determining that asphalt plants contributed
"significantly": "the rate of emissions... from uncontrolled plants,
the stringency of existing state and local regulations.. ., the num-
ber of existing plants, and the expected rate of growth in the
number of plants." 71 Noting a study ranking the asphalt industry
as "one of the top twenty contributors to particulate matter pollu-
tion," the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the EPA's determi-
nation in National Asphalt Pavement Ass'n v. Train.7
2
In this case, the industry had argued that improvements in
control of emissions from asphalt plants since 1967 made that in.
dustry no longer a "significant" contributor. The court, however,
rejected the premise on which the argument was based:
We . . . find a fundamental flaw in the contention that
once an industry complies with regulations designed to
reduce air pollution to the level established by national
... air quality standards, it is no longer a "significant con-
tributor" subject to new source regulation. . . . [W]e
take [the Administrator's] decision to be that construction
of new plants subject only to current emission limitations
would "significantly contribute" to future air pollution
problems. 73
In terms of the policy of section 1I1 the industry contention was
correctly rejected. Since the aim was to prevent "new pollution
problems," 74 the question should be whether future plants pose
a risk of significant contribution. As the statute stood when the
Asphalt case was decided, it encouraged such an interpretation,
as it embraced sources that "may contribute significantly" to an
air-pollution danger.75 Unfortunately, the 1977 amendment, which
was laudably intended to emphasize the precautionary nature of
section 111, actually makes it more difficult to effectuate that policy
in a case like Asphalt. The amendment substitutes the present
indicative "causes or contributes" for the earlier "may contribute,"
suggesting that the category to be regulated must be a significant
71 National Asphalt Pavement Ass'n v. Train, 539 F.2d 775, 784 (D.C. Cir.
1976).
72 Id. 784-85 & n.7.
73 Id. 785.
74 See S. REP. No. 1196, supra note 14, at 16.
7542 U.S.C. § 1857c-6(b)(1)(A) (1970).
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contributor at the time the regulation is conceived. The predic-
tive word "may" appears now only in connection with the further
requirement that the pollution caused "endanger" health or wel-
fare. Similarly, the "causes or contributes" terminology casts a
cloud upon the ability of the Administrator to regulate sources of a
type never before constructed, because until they are operating they
do not cause or contribute to air pollution. To hold that the
amendment has impaired the predictive authority of section 111
would pervert its purpose; one hopes and expects that the courts
will find some way to hold the word "may" applicable to significant
contribution as well as to endangerment, despite the careless
drafting.
In the Asphalt case both the EPA and the court relied heavily
on the perceived inadequacy of existing state and local regulation
to justify the decision that future asphalt plants would "contribute
significantly" to pollution. One might draw the inference that
federal regulation is permitted only if state regulation is inadequate.
This would be a startling conclusion to draw from a provision that
is based upon the policy of avoiding potential harm and that makes
no mention of state law. There is no requirement here, as there is
in section 110,76 that state standards be adopted unless found want-
ing; the statute seems to say that the regulation of major new
sources is a federal responsibility. Unfortunately, the statutory
language again gets in the way. Arguably it cannot be said that a
category of sources will contribute significantly to air pollution-
even in the future-if it is already subject to stringent state limita-
tions. So far as I can see, this problem was not considered when
the language was drafted. In accordance with the cautionary statu-
tory purpose, I would strive to construe the language to refer to a
category of sources whose potential contribution to pollution is
significant; that is, to one that would contribute significantly if
uncontrolled.
The phrasing of the endangerment provision as a threshold
requirement posed a procedural as well as a substantive difficulty in
the Asphalt case. The Administrator's first duty is to publish a
"list" of source categories that make the requisite contribution to
air-pollution danger; then he is to propose and to adopt standards
to control their emissions. This two-step process gave rise in
Asphalt to two opposing arguments, neither of which was com-
patible with sound administrative procedure. The Government
contended that the preliminary determination of significant con-
7642 U.S.C. §7410(a)(2) (Supp. 31 1978).
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tribution was not subject to the notice-and-comment requirements
made applicable by section 111(b) and by the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act 77 to the adoption of the standards themselves; industry
argued that a separate notice-and-comment proceeding had to be
conducted on the threshold issue alone. The court sensibly held
that the propriety of the contribution finding was an issue open for
debate in the notice-and-comment proceeding relating to the pro-
posed standard-but the statute should never have invited alter-
native interpretations. A simple authorization to adopt standards
for new sources with potential for significant contribution to a
pollution danger would have avoided all these difficulties.
2. Mandatory Standards and Major Sources
I have spoken of "authorization," yet Congress spoke in ap-
parently mandatory terms, evidently hoping to avoid administrative
slippage: the Administrator "shall" publish a list, which "shall"
include categories meeting specified criteria; he "shall" publish
proposed regulations; and he "shall" promulgate them. Indeed, he
was required to do all this within a brief and specified period.78
The only argument for discretion lies in the fact that the
categories the Administrator must list are those which "in his
judgment" meet the specified criteria. Clearly this phrase means
that courts are to defer substantially to the Agency's judgment as
to the existence of the requisites for regulation; it was enacted to
prevent the kind of second-guessing represented by the panel de-
cision in the Ethyl case.79 Neither this purpose nor the statutory
language suggests that the Administrator may decline to regulate
sources that in his judgment do contribute significantly to a pollu-
tion danger. The argument that he can avoid regulation by refus-
ing to make a judgment one way or another is hard to reconcile
with the clear command that he publish a list, which seems to
contemplate that he will decide which pollutants satisfy the criteria.
The Second Circuit decision in Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. v. Train,80 holding that section 108(a)'s 81 reference to pol-
775 U.S.C. §553(b), (c) (1976).
7 8 He was given 90 days to publish a list of sources, 120 days thereafter to
propose regulations for them, and another 90 days to adopt regulations, for a total
of ten months. 42 U.S.C. §7411(b)(1)(A), (B) (Supp. II 1978).
79 See text accompanying note 69 supra. Prior to 1977 the requirement was
that he include a pollutant "if he determines" it may have the requisite impact. I
see no significant difference between the two formulations.
80545 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1976).
8142 U.S.C. §7408 (Supp. I 1978).
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lutants "for which the Administrator . . . plans to issue air quality
criteria" does not detract from the duty imposed by a listing re-
quirement otherwise parallel to that of section 111(b),82 reinforces
with a vengeance the conclusion that section 111 is mandatory.
Another 1977 amendment, however, not only substantially
moots the question whether section 111(b) is mandatory but also
seems largely to sidestep the interpretive problems of that para-
graph's reference to significant contribution and danger. Complain-
ing that "under present law, the Administrator has some discretion-
ary authority in listing categories of stationary sources," and that
he had promulgated standards "for only 22 categories," 83 the House
Committee proposed," and Congress in section 111(f) adopted, a
requirement that the Administrator within one year list and within
four years promulgate standards for "the categories of major station-
ary sources" (defined in section 3020) as those having "the potential
to emit . . . one hundred tons per year or more of any air pol-
lutant") 11 "which are not on August 7, 1977, included on the list
required under subsection (b)(1)(A). 6
The mandatory nature of this provision is unmistakable. At
the very least it requires that standards be adopted for all "major"
sources that meet the requirements of section 111(b), that is, for
those which contribute significantly to a pollution danger. The
EPA seems to have embraced this interpretation: its proposed list
of sources to be regulated under the 1977 amendment includes only
those with a potential to emit the prescribed amounts of one or
more of nine specified pollutants that clearly pose significant threats
to health and welfare.
8 7
On its face, however, section 111 (f) does far more: it seems to
require regulation of every "major" stationary source whether or
not it contributes significantly to a pollution danger. Given the
definition of "air pollutant" as "any physical, chemical, biological,
radioactive . . . substance or matter which . . . enters the ambient
82 Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 545 F.2d at 325.
83H.R. BEP. No. 294, supra note 17, at 194, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & An. NEws at 1273.
84 Id. 194, 358-59.
85 42 U.S.C. § 7602(j) (Supp. II 1978). For interpretation of the term "po-
tential" as used in this context with respect to the significant-deterioration provision
of § 169(1), 42 U.S.C. § 7479(1) (Supp. II 1978), see Alabama Power Co. v.
Costle, 606 F.2d 1068, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1979). For criticism see Nondegradation,
supra note 7, at 55-56.
S0d. §7411(f)(1).
8743 Fed. Reg. 38,872 (1978).
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air," Is it seems to require standards for any sources with the poten-
tial to emit 100 tons per year of carbon dioxide or water. Elimina-
tion of the confusing requirements of section 111(b)(1)(A) is a step
forward, but the administrative burden of regulating sources that
do not pose a significant danger seems excessive. In any event, the
problem of determining significant contribution remains as to cate-
gories of sources that are not "major." The 1977 amendments
recognize this by requiring listing not only of "major" sources but
also of those that are not "major," upon application by the governor
of any state showing that the sources nevertheless meet the criteria
of section 1ll(b)()(A). 9
3. Grain Elevators and Federal Sources
The 1977 amendments, in section 111(i), added one naked
special-interest provision: "[a]ny regulations promulgated by the
Administrator under this section applicable to grain elevators shall
not apply to country elevators (as defined by the Administrator)
which have a storage capacity of less than two million five hundred
thousand bushels." 00 There may be legitimate reasons for believ-
ing that small rural grain elevators are entitled to separate treat-
ment, but it is hard to imagine any justification for exempting
them from potential regulation altogether.
The federal government does not escape regulation under the
Clean Air Act. Section 111(b) (4) expressly provides that "the pro-
visions of this section shall apply to any new source owned or
operated by the United States." 91
C. The Criteria for Promulgation
While sections 111(b), (f), and (i) 92 identify the sources for
which standards are to be adopted, section 111 (a), in defining a
"standard of performance," lays down the criteria that are to guide
the Administrator in determining the content of the standard.
Under the original 1970 statute a "standard of performance" was
"a standard for emissions of air pollutants which reflects the de-
8S42 U.S.C. §7602(g) (Supp. II 1978).
891d. §7411(g)(1), (2). This provision seems to add little to the pre-
existing § 304, which authorizes citizen suits to compel performance of nondiscre-
tionary duties and which has been used often to compel issuance of required
regulations. 42 U.S.C. §7604 (Supp. II 1978). See, e.g., Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 545 F.2d 320 (2d Cir. 1976).
9042 U.S.C. §7411(i) (Supp. II 1978).
91Id. § 7411(b) (4).
92Id. § 7411 (b) (f) (2).
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gree of emission limitation achievable through the application
of the best system of emission reduction which (taking into
account the cost of achieving such reduction) the Administra-
tor determines has been adequately demonstrated." 93
This definition has been complicated by 1977 amendments,
which shall be discussed in their turn. The central elements of
the original provision remain in the amendments, however, and
the considerable experience gained in their application remains
of value in interpreting and criticizing the present provisions. One
immediately apparent defect in this scheme is that it does not allow
a standard to be set forbidding the construction of a source whose
emissions would create an unreasonable health risk despite use of
the best available technology.
1. "A Standard for Emissions"
The superficial contrast between "standards of performance"
in section 111 and "emission standards" for hazardous pollutants
under section 112" is unnecessary and misleading: the original
section 111(a) defined a "standard of performance" as "a standard
for emissions." The 1977 amendments, while departing from the
simple equation of performance and emission standards, still de-
fine the former in part as "a standard . . . establishing allowable
emission limitations." 95 As described below, similar language in
section 112 was narrowly construed by the Supreme Court to ex-
clude regulations requiring the wetting of buildings before demoli-
tion in order to reduce asbestos emissions."6 To avoid such results,
the 1977 amendments, in section 111(h), authorize the Admin-
istrator to promulgate "a design, equipment, work practice, or
operational standard, or combination thereof," when "it is not
feasible to prescribe a standard of performance." 97 So long as a
standard has the effect of limiting emissions, its form is no longer
likely to be the overriding consideration.
2. Technology and Cost
The basic statutory program for controlling existing sources
of air pollution, contained in section 110, is based upon the degree
of control necessary to provide ambient levels that will not harm
9342 U.S.C. §1857c-6(a)(1) (1970).
94 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (Supp. II 1978).
95 Id. § 7411 (a) (1) (A).
96 See text accompanying notes 417-52 supra.
9742 U.S.C. §7411(h)(1) (Supp. II 1978).
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health or welfare.98 New-source performance standards, however,
are based on the contrasting philosophy of requiring as much con-
trol as can be provided within certain bounds of cost.
As I have said elsewhere,99 uniform technological require-
ments will result in diverse ambient pollution levels because of
geographical variations in such factors as meteorological conditions,
topography, and the number and size of emission sources. Thus,
technology-based standards are likely to be more stringent in some
places and less stringent in others than is necessary to achieve com-
pliance with ambient standards. The House Report in 1977 none-
theless provided an extensive list of arguments for imposing
technological standards. Uniform national standards help "to
avoid situations in which industries could be lured to one state
by relaxing emissions standards or deadlines and away from other
states with stricter standards." 100 Since ambient standards made
the air "a finite resource," a requirement of best technology would
ration that resource so that "more new sources could locate in any
given area." '0' Third, "[b]uilding control technology into new
plants at time of construction will plainly be less costly then [sic]
requiring retrofit when pollution ceilings are reached." 102 Tech-
nological standards were also "intended to create incentives for
improved technology, which could achieve greater or equivalent
emission reduction at equivalent or lower cost." 103 Elsewhere the
Report indicated doubt as to whether ambient standards had been
or could be set at levels that really prevented all injury.1'4 Like
the provisions preventing significant deterioration of clean areas,10 5
9842 U.S.C. §§7408-7410 (Supp. II 1978).
99 See Currie, Rulemaking Under the Illinois Pollution Law, 42 U. Cm. L.
REv. 457, 491-92 (1975).
100 H.R. RF,. No. 294, supra note 17, at 184, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 1077, 1263.
101 Id. 185, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws at 1263. This
rationale is in tune with the general tenor of the 1977 amendments, which had as
a central purpose the accommodation of industrial growth and clean air standards.
See, e.g., Comment, Emission-Offset Banking: Accommodating industrial Growth
With Clean-Air Standards, 128 U. PA. L. REv. 937 (1980) and authorities cited
therein.
102 H.R. REP. No. 294, supra note 17, at 185, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & An. NEWS at 1264.
103Id. 186, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CoNG. & An. NEws at 1265.
I have omitted for the moment the arguments that address the question whether
the standards should permit compliance by the use of clean fuels alone. See text
accompanying notes 209-30 supra.
104 H.R. REP. No. 294, supra note 17, at 127, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CoNG. & An. NEws at 1206.
10542 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7479 (Supp. II 1978). See Nondegradation, supra note
7, at 48.
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standards requiring best efforts to control emissions reflect "a policy
of maximum practicable protection of health." 106
a. "Adequately Demonstrated"
The first requirement of a performance standard under section
Ill is that the technology needed to achieve it "has been adequately
demonstrated." 107 Some of the practical, legal, and policy diffi-
culties of administering this provision can be illustrated by a de-
tailed examination of the problem of sulfur dioxide emissions from
power plants.
(i) The Development of Flue-Gas Desulfurization
"[T]he combustion of sulfur-bearing fuels," particularly of
coal, the EPA's predecessor reported in 1969, was the principal
source of sulfur-oxide pollution in the United States; 108 a large
percentage of that combustion was for the purpose of generating
electricity. The sulfur content of fuels is highly variable, resulting
in uncontrolled power-plant sulfur dioxide (SO 2) emissions rang-
ing "from 1 to 7 pounds per million Btu." 109 Consequently
"[o]ne of the best existing methods for reducing sulfur oxide emis-
sions from fuel combustion sources is the use of low-sulfur fuels." 110
This indeed was the option chosen by many plant operators, such
as Chicago's Commonwealth Edison, despite a variety of difficulties,
including transportation costs that in some cases actually doubled
the fuel bill.I". Unfortunately the EPA found in 1974 that "low-
sulfur fuel supplies are now and will continue to be inadequate
to provide the sole means of complying with SO: [sulfur oxide]
emission limitations." 112 This meant that "flue gas desulfuriza-
106 H.R. REP. No. 294, supra note 17, at 127, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CoNG. & AD. NEws at 1206.
10742 U.S.C. §7411 (a)(1) (Supp. II 1978).
1 0 8 PUBLIC HEALTH SERvICE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE,
CONTROL TEcm Es FOR SULFUR OXIDE PoLr.ANTs xvii (Pub. No. AP-52)
(1969) [hereinafter cited as CoNrOL TEcHNiQ Es].
109 U.S. EPA, BACKGROUND INFORMATION FOR PROPOSED NEw-SoTRCE PER-
FORuMNE STANDADs 6 (1971) [hereinafter cited as BACKGROUND INFORMATION].
110 CONTROL TEcHNIQUEs, supra note 108, at xviii.
111 See Commonwealth Edison Co. v. EPA, slip op. (Ill. P.C.B. Jan. 3, 1975);
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. EPA, 5 Il1. P.C.B. 101, 102 (1972); In re Emis-
sion Standards, 4 IlM. P.C.B. 298, 330-31 (1972); D. CURlE, POLLUTION CAsEs
& MTRmuIAs 251 (1975).
112 U.S. EPA, REPORT OF THE HEARING PANEL: NATIONAL PuBLc HFAmNGS
ON PowER PLANr COMPLIANCE WITH SULFUR OIDE AIR POLLUTION REGULA-
TIoNs 3 (1974) [hereinafter cited as REPORT OF THE NATIONAL PANEL].
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tion (FGD) technology must be installed on a large number of
power plants if sulfur oxide . . . emission requirements adopted
pursuant to the Clean Air Act are to be met in the 1970's." 113
Flue-gas desulfurization involves the removal of sulfur oxides
from exhaust gases after the fuel is burned. The chemical reac-
tions by which this end might be accomplished were well under-
stood in 1969: for example, "limestone injected into the furnace
reacts with the sulfur oxides to form calcium sulfate, a solid, which
is removed by standard dust-collecting equipment." 114 The critical
question was whether the technology was well enough developed-
"adequately demonstrated," in section 111's terms-to justify the
adoption of emission standards that would effectively require its
employment.
The federal government conceded in 1969 that "[n]o flue gas
desulfurization processes are presently in widespread use." 15
However, two "pilot-scale" studies in England had resulted in
"the full-scale, cyclic lime process that was installed in the late
1930's on the Fulham power plant, where it operated successfully
until it was closed during World War II." 116 The English experi-
ence had "spotlighted specific process problems such as high main-
tenance and operating costs, low-temperature corrosion, solid wastes
disposal, and loss of plume buoyancy resulting in high localized
ground-level concentration of SO 2 and other emissions." 117 More
recently a somewhat different technology had been tested on "about
1.0 percent of the total boiler flue gas" from a "full-scale 170-
megawatt boiler." 118 The test had been followed by "the purchase
of the limestone-injection wet-scrubbing process for use on three
full-scale power plant boilers," with "a guaranteed removal effici-
ency of 80 percent of SO2," and "one of these systems [was] cur-
rently in preliminary operation at the Union Electric Company's
Meramec Plant in St. Louis." 119
Two years later, in 1971, the EPA published its proposed
standard of 1.2 pounds per million Btu for large new coal-burning
power plants under section 111.120 Two of the full-scale units
1131d. 2.
1 14 
CONTROL TEcHIQmuEs, supra note 108, at xviii.
115 Id.
116 Id. 52-53.
117 Id. 53.
118 Id.
119 Id. 53-54.
120 36 Fed. Reg. 15,704, 15,706 (1971).
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purchased in 1969 had "approached" the proposed level over a six-
month period,' 12 and it was largely on this basis that the standard
was promulgated.j2 A "supplemental statement" issued after judi-
cial review was sought emphasized the success of three additional
installations, one of them quite small (seven mw) and all three
burning oil. The Agency contended that, although the scrubbing
systems employed at these installations had never been operated on
coal-fired units, "[s]ince precipitators have been shown to remove
particulates down to the same level as oil-fired units, application of
the sulfite system to coal-fired boilers should be feasible." 123 The
District of Columbia Circuit, in Essex Chemical Corp. v. Ruckels-
haus,'24 found-with very little discussion-the evidence sufficient
under section 111: "The evidence, including tests of prototype and
full-scale control systems, consideration of available fuel supplies,
literature sources, and documentation of manufacturer guarantees
and expectations, convinces us that the systems proposed are ade-
quately demonstrated . 16... 25
In 1974 the EPA revealed that, "after four years of intermittent
operation filled with numerous technical difficulties," the model-T
scrubber whose first two installations had been the central basis of
the federal regulation had been withdrawn from the market.28
At the same time, however, the EPA reported further progress,
emphasizing three recent installations, one of which had "operated
with near 100 percent reliability controlling a 156-megawatt coal-
fired boiler near Omutu, Japan, since its startup in March 1972." 127
This was not enough for the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, which,
in Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA,28 found enough remaining uncer-
tainties to hold arbitrary the requirement of the widespread use of
scrubbers in an implementation plan under section 110.128 It inter-
preted this section to require "technological feasibility"-not far
from section 111's requirement that the technology be "adequately
demonstrated." 130 The Omutu operation, for example, utilized
121 BACKGROUND INI'ORM-ATION, supra note 109, at 10-11.
-12 36 Fed. Beg. 24,876, 24,879 (1971).
123 37 Fed. Reg. 5,767, 5,769 (1972).
124 486 F.2d 427, 440-41 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974).
125 Id. 440.
12 6 
REPORT OF THE NATiONAL PANF supra note 112, at 72, 75.
127 Id. 5.
128 522 F.2d 1186 (3d Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded for reconsideration,
427 U.S. 902 (1976).
129 Id. 1201.
130 d. 1199 n.36.
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scrubbing agents unavailable to the petitioners, discharged raw
waste into the sea, which would be unacceptable here, and ex-
perienced far less load variation than in a conventional power plant.
Furthermore, its owners did not plan to use the same process in
future installations, and its supplier had "so far been unsuccessful"
in efforts to transfer its success to one of the petitioners' plants. 13'
Late in 1974 the EPA reported that there were nineteen FGD
systems operating in the United States, including two over-100
megawatt coal units that had operated for eight or nine months with
eighty-four percent and ninety percent-3 2 reliability. By this time
industry voices were heard cautiously endorsing FGD technology.
Louisville Gas and Electric called its operations "extremely satis-
fying and gratifying" and ordered additional scrubbers; Arizona
Public Service said its unit "appeared to be quite successful" but
warned that it was not sure the system would work on larger units
or under different conditions. 133 In 1977 the House Committee
was able to say that it had relied chiefly upon "information sup-
plied by independent agencies (not the EPA) and by the historic
opponents of flue gas desulfurization" in concluding that "most of
the controversy as to the reliability and effectiveness of these systems
has largely been eliminated as experience . . . has increased and
as second generation systems have appeared." 13
(ii) Evaluation
Today, then, there seems to be little doubt that FGD tech-
nology is "adequately demonstrated" for purposes of section 111.135
131 Id. 1197-98.
132 U.S. EPA, FLuE GAs DESULF UzAnoN INSTALLATiONS AND OPERAON S
1-2, 8, 15, 17 (1974).
1
3 3 See 5 ENvwm. REp. 1103-04 (1974).
134 H.R. REP. No. 294, supra note 17, at 89, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 1167. See also U.S. EPA, FLuE GAs DESULumRZATION 3N
Powzm PiANTs: STATUS REPORT 1 (1977) ("At the time of this report, . . . 30
systems are operational and 86 are under construction or planned. In Japan 333
systems have been installed.").
135 See also Cleveland Elec. Ilum. Co. v. EPA, 572 F.2d 1150, 1164-65 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978) (upholding power-plant SO 2 limitations
in the federal implementation plan for Ohio against the argument of technological
and economic infeasibility); United States v. West Penn Power Co., 460 F. Supp.
1305 (W.D. Pa. 1978) (ordering construction of a scrubber and reaffirming its
availability at reasonable cost); 43 Fed. Reg. 42,154, 42,158-59 (1978) (proposing
to require 85% scrubbing of emissions from combustion of most low-sulfur fuels
and declaring several scrubbing devices adequately demonstrated); 44 Fed. Reg.
33,580 (1979) (adopting a revised standard that will require 90% scrubbing of
high-sulfur coal). The TVA has agreed to install scrubbers on a number of plants
by 1982, see 9 ENvm. REP. 1451 (1978), and West Penn, after the district court
decision noted above, agreed to install 95% scrubbing by September 1982 in
exchange for freedom from monetary penalties. See id. at 1724 (1979).
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Just when it became so, I submit, is a difficult question to answer.
The first issue to be determined is a legal one: what does section
111(a)(1) mean by "adequately demonstrated"? On its face the term
seems to demand both a finding of fact and a policy judgment: what
is the state of the technology, and is that state sufficiently advanced
that the need for control justifies the risk of failure? The House
and Senate Reports erect outer boundaries to channel the agency's
policy choice. The former admonished that the technology "may
not be . . . purely theoretical or experimental," 136 and the latter
allowed that it need not be "in actual routine use somewhere." 3.7
In between these poles is a vast area of administrative discretion.
If we apply what we know of the legal standard to the sulfur-
oxide situation as it stood in 1969, we find the record quite weak.
FGD technology had been put to substantial actual use in Britain,
but the British data revealed troublesome bugs that deserved further
study. Moreover, the British technology was obsolete, while the
only reported test of new technology had been run on a tiny fraction
of the boiler's exhaust gas. In terms of immediate application the
new technology was barely beyond the "experimental" stage that
the House Report said was insufficient. The prudent Administrator
would probably have concluded that an installation requirement
should await the results of the three promising purchases of new
technology, and should probably have held that the technology was
not yet "adequately demonstrated."
The 1971 record presented a closer question. Two full-scale
units were now in more or less successful operation, and the EPA
was optimistic that an alternative technology might be successfully
transferred from oil to coal. Yet hindsight provides a sobering
note: the full-scale prototypes soon proved to be lemons after all.138
To prevent such risky investments the National Academy of Sciences
has developed a rule of thumb for determining when power-plant
technology is "commercially available": it must be in successful
operation for one year on a plant of at least 100 megawatts. 39 If
"adequately demonstrated" had been equated with this standard,
the EPA could not have required FGD in 1971.
Plainly it was not for the court of appeals in Essex Chemical to
impose any such inflexible limit on the Agency's judgment, and the
136 H.R. REP. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 10 repiinted in [1970] U.S.
CODE CoNa. & A3. NE.ws 5365.
137S. R P. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1970).
1
3 8 See note 126 supra and accompanying text.
139 See In re Emission Standards, 4 I1. P.C.B. 298, 332 (1972).
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court was probably right in deferring to the EPA's determination
because of the limitations on judicial review. On such a record the
finding that the technology was "adequately demonstrated" could
hardly be said to be "arbitrary" or "capricious." 140 Whether the
Agency's finding was correct or not, however, is quite another story.
The contrast between Duquesne Light and the earlier Essex
case is striking. In Essex the court deferred to a highly debatable
Agency conclusion without even bothering to summarize the evi-
dence; in Duquesne, on a much stronger record, the court sub-
stituted its judgment for that of an expert administrator. Even on
the since-repudiated thesis that section 110 implicitly incorporated
something resembling the "adequately demonstrated" requirement
of section 111,141 the Third Circuit seems clearly to have intruded
too far upon the realm of administrative judgment.
Whether an administrator himself would have been justified in
finding FGD technology "adequately demonstrated" on the 1974
record is a much more difficult question. The Omutu experience
satisfied even the cautious NAS definition of "commercial avail-
ability," but there were evident uncertainties in transferring the
Omutu technology to American conditions. Yet businessmen do
not typically wait for all the bugs to be ironed out before investing
in equipment; if they did, one industry consultant has testified, we
would still be waiting for secondary sewage treatment,142 which has
been standard practice in many communities for years. By 1974
FGD technology was beginning to approach the Senate Report's
clear case of "actual routine use"-not everywhere, to be sure, but
in the Report's terminology, "somewhere"-at the Omutu plant
in Japan.
So far we have considered the question of adequate demon-
stration as the EPA and the courts seem to have dealt with it, as a
black-or-white proposition: either the technology is ready for nation-
wide installation today, or no regulation should be adopted at all.
The contemporaneous experience of the Illinois Pollution Control
Board in wrestling with the same problem illustrates that, at least
on the policy level, there are intermediate shades of gray.
Surely the all-or-nothing approach is unattractive. On the one
hand, to have invested millions of dollars in 1971 lemons would
1405 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1970).
141 Union Electric Corp. v. EPA, 427 U.S. 246, 265-66 (1976) ("In sum, we
have concluded that claims of economic or technological infeasibility may not be
considered by the Administrator in evaluating a state requirement . . . . Accord-
ingly, a court of appeals reviewing an approved plan . . . cannot set it aside
[on the ground that it is economically or technologically infeasible]").
142 See In re Emission Standards, 4 Ill. P.C.B. at 333.
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have been a debacle of the first magnitude. On the other, to have
done nothing would have postponed indefinitely the hope of relief
for people in highly polluted areas where sulfur dioxide was a
serious menace to public health. Illinois took a middle course. On
much the same evidence that was the basis of the 1971 federal
regulation, it adopted a standard requiring significant reductions of
sulfur-oxide emissions only in certain metropolitan areas with acute
ambient problems, and it set a compliance date distant enough "to
permit nearly a year of additional information to be accumulated
before commitments must be made." 143
Could the EPA have taken such a middle course? One of the
policy decisions essential to the Illinois position was that the stand-
ard should create an incentive for the development of better tech-
nology. This was one of the stated objectives of section 111,144 but
the statutory requirement that the technology be "adequately
demonstrated" gets in the way. The determination whether tech-
nology meets this standard is to be made -when the standard is
adopted; arguably it means that the control devices may have to be
ready for commercial use at that time.
Judicial interpretation has been less exacting. The District of
Columbia Circuit, in Portland Cement Association v. Ruckel-
shaus,145 concluded in dictum that
[s]ection 111 looks toward what may fairly be projected for
the regulated future, rather than the state of the art at
present, since it is addressed to standards for new plants
. The essential question was rather whether the
technology would be available for installation in new
plants ...
* * * The Administrator may make a projection
based on existing technology .... 146
The court thus read the statute to require only an adequate demon-
stration that the technology will be available when needed to
143Id. 331-35. This regulation was later set aside, for reasons that I, as
author of the Board's opinion, not surprisingly found wanting. See Common-
wealth Edison Co. v. POB, 25 IMI. App. 3d 271, 323 N.E.2d 84 (1st Dist. 1974),
aff'd on other grounds, 62 11. 2d 494, 343 N.E.2d 459, 465 (1976); Currie, supra
note 99, at 501-05.
144 See text accompanying note 103 supra.
145 486 F.2d 375, 391-92 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
146 Id. 391. This discussion was unnecessary to the decision, since the EPA
had based its standard for cement plants upon tests of actual units rather than on
projections. Id. 395, 401-02.
1415
1416 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
comply with the standard. This is not the most natural reading:
it is the technology itself, not its timely availability, that must be
"adequately demonstrated." But perhaps the court was correct in
concluding that such a minor point of phrasing should not be taken
seriously. The court's interpretation certainly conforms to what
the statute ought to say in order to accomplish its purpose.
147
Nevertheless, the court had to concede that even its interpreta-
tion could not afford the EPA much latitude for technology-forcing,
for section 111(b) flatly commands that standards "become effective
upon promulgation." 148 As the court said, "[t]he question of
availability is partially dependent on 'lead time' . . . . Since the
standards here . . . will control new plants immediately, as op-
posed to one or two years in the future, the latitude of projection
is correspondingly narrowed." 149 Thus it appears that the Illinois
approach to sulfur-oxide control relied on technology-forcing to an
extent incompatible with the rigid requirements of section 111.
This is all the more noteworthy in that, as early as 1970, Congress
adopted a most ambitious technology-forcing policy with respect to
vehicle-emission standards, allowing five or six years to meet statu-
tory standards conceded to be beyond existing capability.1 0
Furthermore, the second basic premise of the Illinois decision
was that the acceptable degree of risk of technology failure was
directly proportional to the severity of the particular pollution
problem. Section 111, however, says nothing about balancing risks
against need; it is susceptible to the interpretation that nothing
may be required anywhere until the technology is sufficiently ad-
vanced to justify imposing it on new sources throughout the nation.
Indeed, another explicit purpose of the section was to remove
147 The court relied in part on the Senate Committee's statement, supra note
137, that the technology need not be in "routine use." But this quotation does not
establish that the Committee contemplated prediction of future development, since
technology may be available today without being in routine use. The court also
invoked its earlier parallel interpretation of a somewhat similar provision for sus-
pension of motor-vehicle emission standards in International Harvester Corp. v.
Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973). The relevant language in that case
required a finding that necessary controls "are not available or have not been
available for a sufficient period of time to achieve compliance prior to the effective
date" of the standards. 42 U.S.C. § 1857f-1(b) (5) (D) (1970). Though the use
of the present and present-perfect tenses in this section also makes prediction
questionable, the reference to "prior to the effective date" makes prediction some-
what easier to sustain than under § 111.
14842 U.S.C. §7411(b)(1)(B) (Supp. II 1978).
149 486 F.2d at 391-92.
150 Section 202(b), now 42 U.S.C. § 7521(b) (Supp. II 1978). See Mobile-
Source Provisions, supra note 7, at 816-18.
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competitive geographic advantages, which suggests the intent to im-
pose nationally uniform standards.151
Fortunately, the statutory language does not compel this pro-
crustean conclusion. "Adequately" is a judgmental term that seems
to imply a balance between risk and need. Moreover, in deter-
mining the best technology considering cost the EPA has sometimes
employed a balancing approach, making limitations less demanding
in noncontinental areas with sludge-disposal problems and for plants
using low-sulfur coal.15 2 It would not be too long a step, perhaps,
to make the adequacy of a technology demonstration dependent
upon air quality as well. But the natural thrust of technology-based
standards is toward uniformity, and, whether or not compelled to,
the EPA in 1971 took the all-or-nothing approach of prescribing
uniform nationwide standards. It need not necessarily follow that
the EPA must adopt a single criterion for determining the adequacy
of technology for every pollutant, since variations of this nature
would not create geographical advantages. But if the statute does
require geographic uniformity in the determination of demon-
strated technology, it may be unduly inflexible.
b. "The Degree of Emission Limitation Achievable"
The critical question in Portland Cement Ass'n. v. Ruckel-
shaus153 was not, as with flue-gas desulfurization, whether the
technology on which the standard was based was sufficiently de-
veloped to warrant its installation; rather, it was whether con-
cededly available devices would in fact achieve the emission levels
the EPA said they would.'5 The best way to show what emission
level a control system will achieve is to test it, and that is what
the EPA did in Portland Cement. The opinion in that case con-
tains an informative review of the pitfalls involved in obtaining
accurate and meaningful test information.
The standard for particulate emissions from new cement kilns
was set at 0.30 pounds per ton of feed to the kiln. 55 One dry-
process kiln controlled with a baghouse "showed particulate emis-
sions of 0.20 pound per ton of feed, which is below the proposed
151 See text accompanying note 100 supra.
152 See text accompanying notes 222-25 infra.
153486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
'54 Id. 391.
155 40 C.F.R. § 60.62.(a) (1) (1979).
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standard." 156 Results of tests on a wet-process baghouse, however,
were reported at 0.361, 0.535, and 0.291 pounds per ton.
157
One fundamental question raised by industry was whether the
tests had been properly conducted. In the first place, industry
pointed to departures from standard testing procedures; the court
observed that such deviations "are not necessarily significant as
to testing results," and on remand placed the burden on industry
to "establish that such test deviations bear significant conse-
quences." 158 Second, an industry witness asserted that the EPA
had erroneously computed the volume of gas emitted from the stack,
resulting in a gross overestimate of the raw materials fed to the
kiln, so that actual particulate emissions per ton had been approxi-
mately twice what the EPA had reported. 59 The court demanded
an explanation from the Agency; obviously the test must be ac-
curately performed and reported.
A second basic issue in Portland Cement was whether the
successful tests were reasonably representative of what could be
accomplished by use of the same technology in the industry as a
whole. The first requirement in this respect is that the test be
performed under conditions comparable to those under which the
standard will have to be met in practice, or that there be a reason-
able basis for predicting that the differences will not be significant.
One serious objection to the regulation, "persuasive enough to
merit a remand," 110 was that it was based on tests run exclusively
during normal operations, while in the real world all plants ex-
perience periods of malfunction or startup in which their perform-
ance is inferior.' 61 Because technological feasibility is the statutory
criterion, allowance must be made for unavoidable inadequacies.
1 62
Ultimately, the EPA solved the difficulty by adopting a regulation
exempting these periods from the standard.163 Similarly, the court
356486 F.2d at 395 (quoting an EPA "Background Document").
157 Id. 398.
158 Id. 397.
159 Id. 397-98.
160 Essex Chem. Corp. v. Ruckleshaus, 486 F.2d at 433.
161 486 F.2d at 398-99.
162 Accord, Essex Chem. Corp., 486 F.2d at 433.
16340 C.F.R. § 60.8(c) (1977) (further clarified by 44 Fed. Reg. 57,125-26
(1977)). Section 60.11(d), however, properly requires efforts to minimize emis-
sions during such periods. The Fourth Circuit has held that exemptions for un-
avoidable inadequacies must be provided under comparable technology-based
water-pollution standards. FMC Corp. v. Train, 539 F.2d 973, 986 (4th Cir.
1076). Other courts, distinguishing FMC and the air-pollution cases, have found
that adequate provision for the variability of actual performance has been made in
water-pollution cases in setting the standards and averaging periods themselves.
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required the EPA to explain why thirty-minute tests sufficed to
demonstrate that the standard could be met on the basis of a two-
hour average, 64 and whether the tests had been conducted "at or
above the maximum production rate," as required for compliance
with the standard. 65
On the same principle, industry argued that "a single test
offered a weak basis for inferring that all new cement plants would
be able to meet the proposed standards." 166 Without holding
that a single test would never suffice, the court, quoting Interna-
tional Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, held that "'it would . . .
seem incumbent on the Administrator to estimate the possible
degree of error [inherent] in his prediction.' "167 A few months
later the same court found tests of a single dual-absorption sulfuric-
acid plant sufficient on the record to show the applicable sulfur-
oxide standard achievable. 165 This result seems to follow from the
Senate Committee's insistence that the technology need not be in
"routine use." 169
More serious, perhaps, in light of the largely unfavorable
results suggested by the figures reported for wet-process kilns, was
the question whether successful tests on a dry-process kiln could
be taken as representing what could be done with the wet process
as well. The court found a simple answer. The wet-process tests
had been conducted on a basis different from that prescribed in the
Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011, 1056-58 (D.C. Cir. 1978); American
Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 540 F.2d 1023, 1036 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430
U.S. 922 (1977). See also CPC Int'l, Inc. v. Train, 540 F.2d 1329, 1337-38 (8th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 966 (1977) (finding adequate consideration of
variability). Weyerhaeuser, 590 F.2d at 1058 n.83, distinguishing Essex Chem.
Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 427 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969
(1974), observed: "if, unlike here, EPA ignores [the] possibility of upsets in set-
ting clean air standards, it must take them into account separately." Thus the
basic point of these cases is that the EPA has discretion as to how variability is
to be taken into account, not that variability may be ignored. Yet the Eighth,
Tenth, and District of Columbia Circuits acknowledged that the standards before
them did not exempt 100% of unavoidable failures, and two of them suggested that
this gap was appropriately dealt with by the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
Weyerhaeuser, 590 F.2d at 1058; CPC, Inc., 540 F.2d at 1338. This seems contrary
to the statutory direction to require only what the technology can accomplish. The
Eighth Circuit's subsequent decision in Corn Refiners Ass'n v. Costle, 12 E.R.C.
2035 (1979) went even further in its rationale, relying solely on prosecutorial
discretion without embracing the EPA's argument that variability had been con-
sidered in setting the standards.
'I4 486 F.2d at 397.
105 Id. See also Essex Chem. Corp., 486 F.2d at 436.
166 486 F.2d at 396.
167 Id. (quoting International Harvester Co. v. Ruckleshaus, 478 F.2d at 647).
168 Essex Chem. Corp., 486 F.2d at 437. See also id. at 438 (scrubber for SO 2
at a single "recycle" sulfuric-acid plant).
169 See text accompanying note 137 supra.
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standard; when adjusted for the testing modification, the wet-
process results demonstrated substantial compliance. °70 Thus the
court did not have to reach the question whether the EPA could
appropriately have outlawed the wet process. On that question a
persuasive analogy is drawn from the same court's decision in
International Harvester that vehicle-emission technology could be
considered "available" even if it did not enable every model to
meet the standards-it was enough that the technology permitted
the basic demand for conforming vehicles to be met.
17 1 I would
argue that whether the EPA should adopt a single standard effec-
tively precluding use of a familiar process depends upon considera-
tion of the "cost" of doing so under a further provision, discussed
below.'72
As explained and revised on remand, the Portland Cement
regulation was later upheld. 7 3 The general lesson to be drawn
from all this is that the standard should reflect what the technol-
ogy can achieve in continuous practice. 174 Tests should be run
under actual operating conditions and should be the same for
setting the standard as for determining compliance.1 75
c. The "Best System" Considering "Cost"
A control technique that has been "adequately demonstrated"
in the purely technical sense may nevertheless be prohibitively
expensive, as the Illinois Pollution Control Board found with re-
spect to the distillation of most industrial wastewaters.176 Sensibly,
section 111 (a)(1) is not blind to the question of expense; as noted
above, a standard of performance under the 1970 Act was one re-
flecting application of the "best system of emission reduction which
170 486 F.2d at 396 n.79, 398 n.90. See also Essex Chem. Corp. v. Ruckeshaus,
486 F.2d at 440 n.43 ("Complaints from the industry that it cannot meet the acid
mist standard appear to be based on experience with other test methods than
EPA's.") (quoting EPA statement, 37 Fed. Reg. 5,770 (1972)).
'7' International Harvester Co. v. Ruckeishaus, 478 F.2d at 640. See Mobile-
Source Provisions, supra note 7, at 831-32.
17 2 See text accompanying notes 175-208 infra.
173Portland Cement Ass'n v. Train, 513 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1025 (1975).
174 The EPA has reaffirmed its recognition of this principle by proposing to
revise its aluminum-plant standards to conform with actual tests of the state-of-
the-art technology whose use it had prescribed. See 43 Fed. Reg. 42,186 (1978).
'75 Similar issues were considered briefly in National Asphalt Pavement Ass'n
v. Train, 539 F.2d 775, 786-87 (D.C. Cir. 1976), where the EPA's judgments
were accorded substantial deference. See also Currie, supra note 99, at 495-98.
176 In re Effluent Criteria, 3 IMI. P.C.B. 401, 413 (1972). See Currie, supra
note 99, at 493-94.
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(taking into account the cost of achieving such reduction) . ..has
been adequately demonstrated." 177
(i) The Definition of "Cost"
The 1970 statute spoke of "cost" without defining it. Com-
parison with the parallel provision of the Clean Water Act, which
expressly requires consideration of "the cost of achieving such
effluent reduction and any non-water quality environmental impact
and energy requirements," 178 might suggest, by negative implica-
tion, that "cost" in the Clean Air Act was limited to out-of-pocket
expenses of the discharger. The District of Columbia Circuit,
however, had no difficulty in giving the term "cost" in section
111(a)(1) a properly all-inclusive meaning: the statute required con-
sideration of "counter-productive environmental effects of a pro-
posed standard, as well as economic costs to the industry." 172
Nothing in the committee reports pointed to a narrower construc-
tion, and a rational decision depends on evaluation of all competing
costs and benefits. The court buttressed its natural interpretation
of "cost" with an arguably more contrived reference to the statu-
tory requirement of "best" technology: "we cannot imagine that
Congress intended that 'best' could apply to a system which did
more damage to water than it prevented to air." 180 Indeed, it
was for failure to give adequate consideration to the environmental
costs of disposing of sludge from sulfur-oxide scrubbers that the
District of Columbia Circuit in Essex Chemical remanded sulfur
dioxide standards for power plants and recycle acid plants for
further consideration.
181
The 1977 amendments make the broad meaning of cost ex-
plicit: What the Administrator must take into consideration is
"the cost of achieving such emission reduction, any nonair quality
health and environmental impact, and energy requirements." 182
Since the intention was to make certain that costs were not limited
17742 U.S.C. § 1857-6(1)(a) (1970).
17833 U.S.C. §1316(b)(1)(B) (1976) (emphasis added).
179 Portland Cement Ass'n, 486 F.2d at 385.
180 Id. 386 n.42.
181 Essex Chem. Corp., 386 F.2d at 438-41. On remand the EPA reaffimed
its finding that the problem of sludge disposal was not serious enough to warrant
revision of the regulation. 42 Fed. Reg. 61,541 (1977). For a sequel see the
advertisement by UI International in the New Yorker, May 14, 1979, at 116:
"This road was built with 2000 tons of scrubber sludge from Duquesne Light."
18242 U.S.C. §7411(a)(1) (Supp. J1 1978).
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to the price of the equipment,18 3 the broad approach taken in past
decisions 18 interpreting "cost" should govern consideration of
such unmentioned side effects as the loss of jobs or of tax revenues.
(ii) The Weight to be Given to Cost
Just what weight the Administrator is to give to cost the
statute does not say. The 1970 Senate Report, commenting on a
bill that did not mention cost,18 5 found its consideration implicit
and stated what appears to be the natural meaning of the provision
as adopted: the "technology must be available at a cost.., which
the Secretary determines to be reasonable." 186 Industry argued in
Portland Cement that the statute required "a quantified cost-benefit
analysis, showing the benefit to ambient air conditions as measured
against the cost of the pollution devices." 187 The court held that
no such analysis was required, citing "the specific time constraints
imposed on the administrator" and "[t]he difficulty, if not impos-
sibility, of quantifying the benefit to ambient air conditions." 188
Precisely what the rejection of industry's position means is
not clear. At the very least it means that the benefits of compli-
ance need not be quantified, and that is just as well, given the in-
completeness of present knowledge. But the Administrator had
made no real effort toward even a subjective comparison of costs
and benefits. He had concluded simply that, under the standard,
"the total investment for all installed air pollution control equip-
ment will represent approximately 12 percent of the investment
for the total facility," with operating costs of five to seven per cent
of those of the entire plant. 8 9  Similarly, with respect to electric
'
8 s See H.R. REP. No. 294, supra note 17, at 190, reprinted in [1977] U.S.
CODE CoNG. & AD. NEWS at 1269, stating that "[tihis amendment merely makes
explicit what was implicit in the previous language," and approving the judicial
interpretation.
184 See, e.g., Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelshaus, 486 F.2d 375, 385 (D.C.
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 921 (1974).
185 S. 4358, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. § 113(b)(2) (1970).
186 S. REP. No. 1196, supra note 14, at 16 (1970). See id. 91.
187 486 F.2d at 387.
188 Id. The court did recognize that some reply was due to industry's con-
tention that the standard would effectively preclude the use of less expensive elec-
tronic precipitators or of wet-process kilns: "[o]n remand the Administrator should
consider, as a matter of economic costs, contentions and presentations submitting
that the standard as adopted ... is unduly preclusive as to certain qualities, areas,
or low-cost supplies" of cement. Id. 388.
189 O-mcE OF Am :xtoGRAms, U.S. EPA, BAc=cnouND hqFORMATIOzq FoR
POPOsED NEw-SouRcE PFaoRmANcE STANDrRDs 33 (1971). See Portland
Cement, 486 F.2d at 387.
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plants the Administrator concluded that the cost of particulate con-
trol could be halved if the standard permitted twice the emissions,
yet he gave no reason for adopting the more stringent level.190
After remand the cement standard was upheld against cost objec-
tions because "[t]he industry has not shown inability to adjust
itself in a healthy economic fashion" to the prescribed emission
level,191 and another panel of the same court has paraphrased the
statute as mandating that the required controls not be "exorbitantly
costly." 192 Thus the interpretation of the District of Columbia
Circuit is essentially that no cost is excessive under section 111 (a)(1)
if it does not substantially impair the industry's ability to do a
profitable business.
There is similar language in opinions construing the com-
parable provision of the federal water-pollution statute,193 but I
find unanswerable the dissenting position of Judge Adams in one
such case that the requirement that costs be "taken into considera-
tion" "may be taken to imply some kind of comparison of costs
and benefits." 194 Similarly, the Fourth Circuit has persuasively
held that costs and benefits must be compared, even though they
could not be quantified, in determining effluent limitations for
existing water-pollution sources under section 301(b) (2) of the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act,195 which required applica-
tion of the "best available technology economically achievable": 196
"If no tangible environmental benefits will accrue by increasing
the thermal reduction level from 80%/ to 90%/, the additional ex-
penditure of $3 billion might be considered unjustified." 197 The
natural inference that to take cost "into consideration" implies a
decision whether the standard is worth its expense is strengthened
both by the Senate Report quoted above' 9 and by the existence
of a threshold requirement limiting regulation to sources whose
190 Id. 15-16. See 36 Fed. Reg. 24,876, 24,878-89 (1971).
'loPortland Cement Ass'n, 513 F.2d at 508.
192 See also a similar analysis in National Asphalt Pavement Ass'n, 539 F.2d
at 787, where the cost question was easy because one of the petitioners had con-
ceded that the requisite technology "'can be installed and operated at reasonable
cost."
19333 U.S.C. § 1316(b)(1)(B) (1976).
194 American Iron & Steel Inst. v. Train, 526 F.2d 1027, 1075 n.15 (3d Cir.)
cert. denied, 435 U.S. 914 (1976) (concurring opinion).
195 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1376 (1976).
196Id. §1311(b)(2)(A)(i).
197Appalachian Power Co. v. Train, 545 F.2d 1351, 1361, 1364 (4th Cir.
1976). Accord, American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493, 502-03 (5th
Cir. 1978) (Occupational Safety and Health Act).
198 See test accompanying note 139 supra.
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pollution may "endanger public health or welfare." 119 The impli-
cation is that both the need for the standard and its cost are relevant
to the decision, and that they should be compared as well as is
practicable.
200
To say that costs and benefits should be compared, however,
is not to say how the balance is to be struck. Nor are general
formulas, such as the presumably implicit directive to seek the
optimal level of control expenditures, likely to be very helpful in
resolving concrete problems, given the imponderable factors in
quantifying the benefits of various degrees of control. The EPA
clearly has wide discretion in this regard. Nothing in the Clean
Air Act, for example, tells the EPA whether to prescribe the air
pollution equivalent of secondary or of tertiary sewage treatment.
201
Legislative history of comparable water-pollution provisions suggests
the latter: the "best available technology economically achievable"
is to be based on the achievements of the technology leader.20 2 In
setting new section 111 power-plant standards, however, the EPA
seems to have taken a less extreme position, allowing users of low-
sulfur fuel to utilize scrubbing technology of far less efficiency than
some plants employ in comparable circumstances. 20 3  If section 111
"19942 U.S.C. §7411(b)(1) (Supp. II 1978). See text accompanying note
67 supra.
200 That the endangerment language appears in a threshold requirement rather
thfan in the criteria for setting the standard might be argued to mean that the
benefits of the regulation are to be considered only in determining whether to regu-
late the source category at all. The irrationality of this result is a strong argument
for refusing to believe Congress intended it, and the refusal of the Asphalt decision,
see text accompanying note 77 supra, to give procedural significance to the sepa-
rate statement of threshold requirements is a persuasive precedent.
The applicable standard for judicial review is whether the Administrator's
decision was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
accordance with law," 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (1976), and this determination re-
quires that the Administrator's decision be "based on a consideration of the rele-
vant factors" and that there has not been "a clear error of judgment." Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971); Portland Cement
Ass'n, 486 F.2d at 402. The statute makes cost and public health and welfare
relevant factors: to order an expenditure far outweighing the health or welfare
benefits would be a "clear error of 'judgment' regarding those factors, and thus
arbitrary and capricious. The arbitrary-and-capricious standard has since been
written explicitly into the Clean Air Act for review of designated regulations, in-
cluding those under § 111. 42 U.S.C. §7607(d)(1)(C)(9)(A) (Supp. II 1978).
201 Traditional sewage treatment consists of two stages, primary and secondary,
which together remove roughly 90% of suspended solids and of five-day biochemical
oxygen demand (BOD 5 ), a measure of the oxygen-consuming capacity of the
waste. A variety of third-stage, or tertiary, techniques are available for further
reductions by a factor of two to five, at significant additional cost. See In re
Effluent Criteria, 3 Ill. P.C.B. 755, 765-73 (1972).
202 See S. REP. No. 414, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 57-58 (1972).
203 See text accompanying notes 218-19 infra, 44 Fed. Reg. 33,580, 33,581-84
(1979).
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is construed to require nationwide the air pollution equivalent of
tertiary sewage treatment, the result will once again be that the
statute is both too rigid and too demanding. While such treatment
is appropriate where necessary to meet ambient standards, requiring
its use in every area and circumstance seems likely to impose un-
reasonable costs. 204
(iii) Interindustry Comparisons
A final argument the court in Portland Cement treated as being
cost-related was that the cement industry was subjected to more
exacting standards than power plants or incinerators. The court
found an explanation that "seem[ed] to be supported": "'The dif-
ference . . . is attributable to the superior technology available
[for cement plants] (that is, fabric filter technology has not been
applied to coal-fired steam generators or incinerators).' "205 It
would have sufficed to stop there, but the court ventured a broader
proposition: because interindustry comparison would be "unman-
ageable," "the Administrator is not required to present affirmative
justifications for different standards in different industries." 205
This holding derives strength from the Supreme Court's posi-
tion that an administrative agency need not attempt to impose
equal sanctions for equivalent offenses, 20 7 but when it is stated so
baldly it seems inconsistent both with the "arbitrary" or "capri-
cious" standard of review208o and with constitutional commands of
equality. Perhaps the better answer is that if there is no justifica-
tion for the discrepancy, one of the industry standards does not
require the "best" control system adequately demonstrated; the
erroneous standard-not necessarily the tighter one-should be set
aside for failure to meet the statutory criterion, without reaching
the question of equality.
d. "Technological" Systems
The 1970 Senate Report emphasized that flexibility in the
means of compliance was intended by the choice of the term "stand-
ards of performance": "The Secretary should not make a technical
judgment as to how the standard should be implemented. He
should determine the achievable limits and let the owner or operator
204 See Currie, supra note 99, at 491-95.
205 486 F.2d at 388-89 (quoting 'EPA Background Document").
208 Id. 389.
2 07 Butz v. Glover Livestock Comm. Co., 411 U.S. 182, 185-7 (1973).
208 See note 200 supra.
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determine the most economic, acceptable technique to apply." 209
In full accord with this congressional emphasis on the result rather
than the method, the EPA adopted a single nationwide standard
for the emission of sulfur oxides from coal-fired power plants,2 10
anticipating that individual operators would decide whether to
comply by stack-gas cleaning or by using low-sulfur fuels.21'
Affected citizens, however, promptly sued the EPA, seeking to
have the standard revised so as to require the use of stack-gas scrub-
bers even when low-sulfur fuel was used.212 Before the matter could
be administratively resolved, Congress amended the statute to re-
quire the requested revision. Section 111(a)(1) now requires that
performance standards reflect the best "technological system" of
emission reduction,2 18 and a technological system is defined in
section 111(a)(7) as
(A) a technological process for production or opera-
tion by any source which is inherently low-polluting or
nonpolluting, or
(B) a technological system for . . . reduction of the
pollution generated by a source before such pollution is
emitted into the ambient air, including precombustion
cleaning or treatment of fuels.
21 4
The House Report explains: "inherently low-polluting" processes
include "fluidized bed combustion" and "use of water-based paints
instead of solvents." "Reduction" of pollutants can be by "post-
combustion or postpollution generating" devices such as "flue gas
desurfurization [sic], catalytic combustors, electrostatic precipitators"
or by "preprocess activities" such as "solvent refining, oil desulfuri-
zation/denitrification at the refinery." The central purpose of the
provision is made clear: "[a] major new stationary source may no
longer meet NSPS requirements merely by use of untreated oil or
coal." 215 This is re-emphasized by the new requirement in section
111 (a)(I)(A) that standards for "fossil fuel fired stationary sources"
not only establish "emission limitations" in such terms as pounds
per million Btu but also require "a percentage reduction in the
209S. REP. No. 1196, supra note 14, at 17.
21040 C.F.R. § 60.43(a)(2) (1979).
211 See Background Information, supra note 109, at 10, 12-13.
2 1 2 OIjato Chapter of Navajo Tribe v. Train, 515 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
21342 U.S.C. §7411(a)(1) (Supp. II 1978) (emphasis added).
2 14 1d. §7411(a)(7)(A), (B).
215 H.R. REP. No. 294, supra note 17, at 188, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONe. & An. NEws at 1266.
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emissions . . . which would have resulted from the use of fuels
which are not subject to treatment prior to combustion." 210
If the standards were supposed to reflect the degree of control
required to achieve a given ambient level, the refusal to allow
credit for the use of cleaner fuels would make no sense at all-the
emission rate should be determinative, not the method by which it
was achieved. But to require everyone to use the best available
control equipment regardless of the fuel employed is not incon-
sistent with the actual statutory philosophy of standards reflecting
the greatest practicable reduction of emissions. The amendment
requires a more particularized determination of practicability, recog-
nizing that plants starting with the advantage of clean fuel can
practicably achieve a lower level of emissions. Thus one of the
House Committee's justifications for the amendment was that exist-
ing standards failed to "provide for maximum practicable emission
reduction using locally available fuels, and therefore do not maxi-
mize potential for long-term growth." Moreover, uniform standards
"give a competitive advantage to those States with cheaper low-
sulfur coal," "aggravate compliance problems for existing .
sources which cannot retrofit and which must compete with larger,
new sources for low-sulfur coal," and "operate as a disincentive to
the improvement of technology for new sources." On the other
hand, the amendment would serve the legitimate but ulterior pur-
pose of discouraging reliance on "expensive imported oil." 217
Nevertheless, congressional restriction of the permissible means
of meeting performance standards may stifle innovation. A com-
parable requirement for vehicle emissions, for example, could put
an end to industry efforts to find a fuel with less potential for pol-
lution. Moreover, the use of clean fuels has decided advantages
over add-on control technology, for it simplifies enforcement and
avoids risks of malfunction. In principle, indeed, it is hard to see
why Congress drew the line where it did. The same policy of
maximum control that justifies requiring those who use naturally
clean fuels to install stack-cleaning technology would support ex-
tending that requirement to those who clean the fuel before burn-
ing it, and to those who employ a "low-polluting" process such as
fluidized-bed combustion. As a general policy matter, therefore, a
principle of refusing credit for clean fuels seems to be a question-
able basis for formulating technology-based standards, whether or
211042 U.S.C. §7411(a)(1)(A)(i), (ii) (Supp. 11 1978).
217 H.R. REP. No. 294, supra note 17, at 187, 193, reprinted in [1977] U.S.
CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws at 1266, 1271-72.
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not it can be justified, in the case of low-sulfur fuels, by the need
for additional reductions or by extraneous considerations of energy
policy.
The language of the amendment, moreover, creates a number
of difficulties, the most important of which is whether uniform
percentage reductions are required for all sources. The EPA has
concluded they are not. While it initially proposed to require
eighty-five percent reduction of sulfur oxides from most new power
plants regardless of the composition of their fuel,218 its final regula-
tions require a smaller percentage reduction for plants using low-
sulfur fuel. The basic standard limits emissions to 1.2 pounds per
million Btu and prescribes a ninety percent reduction, but only
seventy percent reduction is required for plants emitting less than
0.6 pounds per million Btu.
19
At first glance the EPA's approach seems squarely contrary to
Congress's decision: the "technological" requirement was based
upon a policy against allowances for the use of clean fuel. Yet the
statutory language is not air-tight. While it requires use of tech-
nological controls, it does not explicitly say that the same degree of
technological control is the "best" everywhere; while it requires a
percentage reduction for fuel-burning sources, it does not explicitly
say that the same percentage must be applied to every plant. Even
the House Report expressed the statutory purpose in terms that are
less than absolute: it said that the amendment was designed to pre-
vent compliance "merely by use of untreated oil or coal," 220 not
that it was meant to forbid any credit for clean fuel. If this were
the whole story, a uniform percentage reduction should be required;
minor cracks in the phraseology would not obscure the overwhelm-
ing congressional objection to reliance on low-sulfur fuel.
The Conference Report, however, radically alters the picture:
[I]n establishing a national percent reduction for new
fossil fuel-fired sources, the Conferees agreed that the Ad-
ministrator may, in his discretion, set a range of pollutant
reduction that reflects varying fuel characteristics . .
[upon] a finding that such a departure does not undermine
the basic purposes of the House provision and other pro-
2 18 See 43 Fed. Reg. 42,154 (1978).
21940 C.F.R. § 60.43a(a)(1), (2) (1979) added by 44 Fed. Reg. 33,580,
33,614 (1979).
220 H.R. Ri. No. 294, supra note 17, at 188, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CoNc. & AD. NEws 1266 (emphasis added).
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visions of the act, such as maximizing the use of locally
available fuels.
221
The latitude apparently conveyed by this passage does not contra-
dict the statutory language, but it does seem to depart from the
original intention. Conceivably a court might find that any sub-
stantial departure from uniformity based on fuel composition
undermines the basic purpose to preclude reliance on clean fuel,
but that interpretation would render meaningless the Conference's
deliberate statement. A Conference Report is a more reliable in-
dicator of the meaning of an ambiguous statute than is the earlier
view of a single House Report which was meant to be superseded.
I conclude that the House's firm policy against low-sulfur fuel was
torpedoed in conference, and that the EPA acted lawfully in allow-
ing a lesser degree of scrubbing when clean fuels are -used.
Even the Conference Report, however, does not appear capable
of avoiding the excessive rigidity of the statutory requirements in
other cases. For example, finding that desulfurization of the ex-
haust from stationary gas turbines would triple or quadruple their
cost, the Administrator sensibly proposed to declare clean fuel their
best practicable means of control.222  Similarly, on the basis of
cost-benefit comparisons the final regulations impose limitations
only in terms of pounds per million Btu upon plants burning
anthracite, 22 3 or located in Hawaii or on certain other islands,224
or burning liquid or gaseous fuel so clean as to emit less than 0.2
pounds per million Btu without controls. 225 Quite apart from the
perplexing question whether the definition of a "standard of per-
formance" as one reflecting "the best technological system" allows
the Administrator to require nontechnological controls when tech-
nology is impracticable, all of these efforts seem squarely contrary
to the independent requirement of a percentage reduction from
221H.R. REPn. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 130, reprinted in [1977] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1511 (1977).
22242 Fed. Beg. 53,782, 53,785 (1977).
22340 C.F.R. § 60.43a(d) (1) (1979), added by 44 Fed. Beg. 33,580, 33,615
(1979). Reasons given, id. at 33,590, include the low sulfur content of anthracite
and the desire to make this fuel cost-competitive so as to encourage the reopening
and ultimate reclamation of abandoned mines now causing water pollution.
22440 C.F.R. § 60.43a(d) (3) (1979). See 43 Fed. Beg. 42,157, 42,175
(1978), citing "the costs of requiring FGD systems in light of the limited land
area available for sludge disposal."
22540 C.F.R. § 60.43a(b) (2), 44 Fed. Beg. 33,614 (1979). For explanation
of an earlier proposal that would have extended this exemption to clean solid fuels
such as wood because of the trivial benefits of costly scrubbing see 43 Fed. Reg.
42,154, 42,158 (1978).
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uncontrolled emissions. The Agency once argued that compliance
with a 0.2 limit for very clean fuels "would constitute compli-
ance with the percentage reduction requirement." 226 It would
do nothing of the sort, for by hypothesis the 0.2 level can be met
in such a case without any reduction in uncontrolled emissions.
To allow the percentage reduction to be set at zero is to expunge
the requirement from the statute.227
Moreover, there may be some difficulty in distinguishing "in-
herently low-polluting" processes, which are permissible means of
achieving a standard, from unacceptable non-"technological"
means. On its face I should have thought the term "process"
referred to the method by which a product is manufactured or a
fuel is burned, as opposed to a change in the raw materials used.
Yet the House Report identifies "use of water-based paints instead
of solvents" as a nonpolluting "process." 228 1 cannot see how
such a substitution of ingredients differs analytically or in statutory
terms from the fuel substitution the amendment was plainly de-
signed to forestall.
In short, Congress seems to have purchased trouble by the
terminology it used to express its simple command that plants
burning low-sulfur fuel should also employ flue-gas desulfurization.
Part of the difficulty stems from the attempt to generalize from
this case to a broad principle favoring "technological" controls.
The example of water-based paint shows that such a principle is
not wise and that it does not accurately reflect what Congress had
in mind. Similarly, the allowance of credit for pre-combustion
fuel cleaning shows that the amendments do not reflect a general
principle requiring cumulation of alternative control techniques.
Congress simply disagreed with the Agency's evaluation of prac-
ticability in the context of fuels naturally low in sulfur, and it
should not have attempted to state a more general principle.
Additionally, the flat requirement of a percentage reduction,
while responsive to the felt need to require scrubbing despite use
of low-sulfur coal, was obtusely insensitive to the likelihood of
special situations in which the costs of scrubbing are quite unrea-
sonable. Congress might at least have prescribed that percentage
reduction was unnecessary if a specified insignificant emission level,
22643 Fed. Reg. 42,160 (1978).
227 See also 8 ENvUi. BRP. (BNA) 822 (1977) (noting industry's objections to
the necessary application of the percentage requirement, designed to deal with the
problem of low-sulfur fuels, to particulates, and to nitrogen o:ddes).
228H.R. 'EP. No. 294, supra note 17, at 188, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 1267. See text accompanying note 222 supra.
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such as 0.2 pounds per million Btu, could be achieved without it.
The case of the gas turbine,229 however, suggests the risks that
attend any congressional effort to foresee and provide for every
instance that does not fit into the general pattern.2 30  Assuming
Congress was correct in insisting on the scrubbing of low-sulfur
coal in ordinary cases, it should simply have required a percentage
reduction with provision for categorical exemption based upon
unusually high costs or low benefits. If the Agency cannot be
trusted to administer such a safety valve in the spirit of the con-
gressional purpose, it will find a way to frustrate even the most
specific legislative direction.
e. "Continuous" Controls
The 1977 amendments also add that the control system re-
flected by the performance standards must be one of "continuous"
emission reduction.23 1  This requirement is derived from experi-
ence under the implementation-plan 2 32 provisions of section 110,
which I have described elsewhere.2 33 It is intended to forbid reli-
ance on intermittent control strategies, such as temporary use of
low-sulfur fuels or reductions in plant output, which were once
put forward as means of complying with ambient standards during
adverse conditions without the necessity for installing permanent
controls.234 Because new-source standards are not based upon am-
bient values, the requirement of continuous controls when avail-
able may even have been implicit in the original section 111. By
defining a "standard of performance" as one requiring "continuous"
controls, the amendment invites the conclusion that only con-
tinuous controls may be required, so that the Administrator can-
not require under section 111 the stockpiling of clean fuels to limit
emissions of a pollutant for which the available continuous-control
technology is poorly developed. Such a result would be most un-
fortunate, since the aim clearly was to require more, rather than
less, control. The courts should be expected to hold that the
amendments only express a preference for continuous controls
whenever they are practicable, but the language was not well chosen.
=2 9 See text accompanying note 222 supra.
230 As does the problem of solid-waste disposal on islands. See note 224 supra,
23142 U.S.C. §7411(a)(1) (Supp. II 1978).
232Id. §7423(a), (b).
233 See Federal Air-Quality Standards, supra note 7, at 375-77.
234 See H.R. EnP. No. 294, supra note 17, at 92, reprinted in [1977] U.S.
CoDE CONG. & AD. NEws at 1170-71.
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D. Procedure for Adoption
1. The Portland Cement Reforms
The original section 111(b) provided only that interested
persons should be afforded "an opportunity for written comment"
on proposed new-source standards before their adoption. 235  The
Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which applied of its own
force because it was not "expressly" modified or superseded by
section 111,216 conferred a substantially identical right to "an op-
portunity to participate . . . through submission of written data,
views, or arguments," together with advance notice in the Federal
Register of "either the terms of substance of the proposed rule or a
description of the subjects and issues involved" and "a concise
general statement of . . . basis and purpose" in the rules as
adopted.
237
The performance standard for particulates challenged in Port-
land Cement Association v. Ruckelshaus 23s was largely based, as I
have noted,23 9 on tests run on two existing kilns. Yet the EPA did
not give public notice of the details of those tests until after the reg-
ulation had been adopted and the case was in the court of appeals.
As soon as the information became available, an industry expert
who analyzed it pointed to apparent gross errors in testing pro-
cedures that, if substantiated, would have undermined the justifica-
tion for the standard. The court remanded the matter "so that the
agency might consider the additional comments on the tests." 240
The EPA added the comments to the record but did not respond
to them; the court remanded again, saying that "the purpose of our
prior remand cannot be realized unless we hear EPA's response" to
the industry comments. Although some of the claims made in court
had not been presented to the EPA, the court required them to be
considered since a remand was necessary on other grounds.241
Three distinct principles-of considerable significance for rule-
making procedure in general-are found in the two remands in
Portland Cement. The first involves agency disclosure. In order-
ing the EPA to accept additional comments when the case was being
appealed, the court declared that the agency had an obligation to
23542 U.S.C. § 1857c-6(b)(1)(B) (1970).
2365 U.S.C. § 559 (1970).
237 Id. § 553(b), (c).
238 486 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
239 See text accompanying notes 153-57 supra.
240 486 F.2d at 393.
241 Id. 392-95.
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disclose not only the content of the proposed regulation, as required
by the APA, but also the information on which the proposal
was based:
It is not consonant with the purpose of a rule-making
proceeding to promulgate rules on the basis of . . data
that . . . is known only to the agency.
[I]nformation should generally be disclosed as to the
basis of a proposed rule at the time of issuance. If this
is not feasible, . . . information . . . should be disclosed
as it becomes available .... 24
As a policy matter this disclosure requirement is exemplary.
The Administrative Conference agrees with it, recommending that
"to the extent feasible" an agency should "make available docu-
ments, materials and public submissions upon which a rule is
based." 243 The EPA itself endorsed disclosure: "There seems to
be no adequate justification for revealing such material only at the
time of final promulgation" or later; early disclosure will "improve
the process of informal rulemaking itself and lessen . . . the need
for judicial review" by "facilitating timely and informed comment
and increasing the likelihood that hard problems will be addressed
before final promulgaion."244 The Supreme Court in Morgan (II)
v. United States emphasized the importance of disclosure in the
context of ratemaking for Kansas City livestock brokers: "The right
to a hearing embraces not only the right to present evidence but
also a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the opposing
party and to meet them. The right to submit argument implies
that opportunity; otherwise the right may be but a barren one." 245
The court of appeals echoed this reasoning in Portland Cement:
"Obviously a prerequisite to the ability to make meaningful com-
ment [as guaranteed by section 11 and by the APA] is to know the
basis upon which the rule is proposed." 246
That disclosure of the basis for a proposed rule is sound policy
does not make it law, and the Supreme Court has recently empha-
242 Id. 393-94.
243 Bee. 71-6, ACUS Recommendations & Reports 35 (1970-72).
244EPA, Comments on Proposed ACUS Rec. 74-4, g[1(4) 14, 22 (1974).
The EPA integrated the Cement disclosure requirement into its practice for efflu-
ent guidelines under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 38 Fed. Beg. 21,202-
06 (1973).
245304 U.S. 1, 18 (1938).
246 486 F.2d at 393 n.67.
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sized in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc.2 4 7 that the courts are not to impose upon
agencies rule-making procedures beyond those required by statute
or by the Constitution. The Constitution is not a likely source of
support for Portland Cement, since the Supreme Court has held
that, in general rulemaking, due process gives no right to be heard
at all.248 The proceedings in Morgan itself, while involving rates
of a number of brokers, were treated by the Supreme Court as
"quasi-judicial," 249 and the decision was based on interpretation of
a statutory requirement of a "full hearing" that is not found in the
Clean Air Act or in the APA. The latter's notice requirement is
no help, since it speaks only of the "terms or substance" of the
proposal, not of its justification. And the attempts of the court of
appeals to derive support for Portland Cement from the statutory
provisions for judicial review, 50 which say nothing about disclosure,
may be too tenuous to survive Vermont Yankee.
51
Judge Leventhal, in the Portland Cement opinion, put his
finger on the best legal argument for the disclosure requirement.
In affording the "opportunity" for submission of written comments
under both section 111(b) and the APA, the court implied, Con-
gress must have intended a meaningful opportunity to comment.
Since disclosure of the basis of a proposal is essential to make the
opportunity meaningful, it may therefore be appropriate to construe
the statutory right to comment as implicitly requiring disclosure.
On this point the Morgan opinion is highly persuasive precedent:
"The right to submit argument [in Portland Cement, the right to
submit comments] implies". "a reasonable opportunity to know the
claims of the opposing party." 252
Nevertheless there are strong arguments for deciding that the
opportunity for comment cannot properly be read to create an obli-
gation to disclose the basis for a proposed regulation. Professor
Scalia argues, for example, that the existence of the separate pro-
vision for notice in section 553(b), which does not include the basis
247435 U.S. 519 (1978).
248 Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. Colorado, 239 U.S. 441 (1915), cited with apparent
approval in United States v. Florida East Coast By., 410 U.S. 224, 245 (1973).
249 304 U.S. at 14.
250 "We considered this opportunity to make further comments necessary to
sound execution of our judicial review function." 486 F.2d at 393. See also Home
Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 54 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
251 The strongest argument would be that a regulation based upon information
there was no right to rebut was "arbitrary' or "capricious" under 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2) (A) (1976) in that it was without adequate support.
252 304 U.S. at 18.
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of the proposal, shows that the comment requirement was not meant
to deal with disclosure.2 3 Although the notice provision may have
been inserted out of unnecessary caution, Professor Scalia's inter-
pretation is at least as probable. The Portland Cement interpreta-
tion, moreover, is a latter-day discovery; no one pretends that
Congress had any such requirement in mind when it adopted the
APA. Indeed, the House Report on the APA appeared to treat the
disclosure of such information as optional: "Summaries and reports
may also be issued as aids in securing public comment or sugges-
tions," and "[o]pen proceedings may be aided by the submission of
reports or summaries of data by agency representatives." 2 Finally,
there is nothing to show that in section 111's comment provision
Congress meant to add anything to the apparently identical require-
ments of the APA. The fate of Portland Cement's wholesome dis-
closure requirement after Vermont Yankee, except in proceedings
in which it has been specifically imposed by statute or regulation,
appears uncertain.
The second procedural holding in Portland Cement was that
the EPA had "an obligation to comment on matters identified as
potentially significant by the court order remanding for further
presentation." 255 Once again, in policy terms this is an attractive
requirement, as it adds to public confidence in the standard and
facilitates evaluation of its propriety. A later Second Circuit deci-
sion has drawn legal support for this requirement from the APA's
requirement of a "concise statement of basis and purpose" of the
regulation:
[T]he comment that to apply the proposed [FDA food
processing] requirements to whitefish would destroy the
commercial product was neither discussed nor answered.
We think that to sanction silence in the face of such vital
questions would be to make the statutory requirement of a
'concise general statement' less than an adequate safe-
guard against arbitrary decision-making. 6
Similarly, though the requirement of an explanatory statement
had been read almost out of existence by the District of Columbia
253 Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The AA, the D.C. Circuit, and the Supreme
Court, 1978 Sup. CT. REv. 345, 380-81 n.154.
254H .R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-25 (1946).
255 486 F.2d at 394.
2 56 United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 253 (2d
Cir. 1977).
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Circuit in Kennecott Copper Corp. v. EPA,2 7 other decisions of
that court have construed it to require that the statement be de-
tailed enough to show "what major issues of policy were venti-
lated ... and why the agency reacted to them as it did." 258
Committee reports on the APA seem to support the latter
interpretation. After observing that the agency must "consider
all relevant matter presented," both House and Senate Reports
declared that the required statement "should not only relate to
the data so presented but with reasonable fullness explain the
actual basis and objectives of the rule." 259 On the other hand,
the Attorney General's respected Manual on the Administrative
Procedure Act minimized the contents of the required statement.2 60
Additionally, the contrast with the APA's requirement of "findings
and conclusions, and the reasons or basis therefor, on all the mate-
rial issues of fact, law, or discretion presented" in formal adjudica-
tion 261 suggests that something much less elaborate was expected in
informal rulemaking.2 62
In Portland Cement itself the court suggested another legal
basis for the requirement of a response: "If this were a private
lawsuit, we might reverse the order ... for failure of its proponent
to meet the burden of refutation or explanation." 263 The impli-
cation was that the industry comments raised such substantial
doubts as to EPA methodology that the materials before the court
did not adequately support the standard. However, the proper
disposition of a regulation if the record is inadequate to support
it is to set it aside, not to order a response. 2" Thus, the legality
of the response requirement under the APA also appears uncer-
tain after Vermont Yankee.
Finally, the Portland Cement court added that generally "chal-
lenges to standards must be limited to points made by petitioners
in agency proceedings," because "to entertain comments made for
the first time before this court would be destructive of a meaning-
257 462 F.2d 846, 850 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
258 See, e.g., Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d 330, 338
(D.C. Cir. 1968).
259 H.R. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1946); S. REP. No. 752,
79th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1946).
260 [1947] A-roRmNY GENERAL's MANTUAL ON ThE ADMI NSTRATVE .RoCnuRE
ACT 32.
2615 U.S.C. §557(c) (1976).
262 See Scalia, supra note 253, at 378-80 ("There is no doubt that the burden
meant to be imposed by this provision was minimal").
263 486 F.2d at 393.
2645 U.S.C. §706(2)(A) (1976).
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ful administrative process." 285 Despite the obvious force of the
court's policy argument, such a requirement has the unfortunate
potential for cutting off the rights of unsuspecting persons-a
danger much reduced in adjudication because only parties are
bound by the decision, whereas the regulation in Portland Cement
was of general application. 266 Moreover, no legal basis for this
limitation was spelled out in the opinion, and it is not easy to find
one.
2. The 1977 Amendments
In recent years Congress has exhibited an increasing lack of
confidence in the basic rulemaking procedures of the APA; in
statute after statute it prescribes additional procedures that must
be followed in the adoption of various regulations. 26 ' Section
307 (d) of the Clean Air Act, added in 1977, is a reflection of this
trend. For a broad range of rulemaking activities, including new-
source performance standards under section 111,268 the amend-
ment makes the APA inapplicable 2(9 and institutes a much more
demanding set of procedures than those explicitly found in the
original section 111.
Section 307(d)(3) makes explicit the disclosure requirement of
Portland Cement by requiring that Federal Register notice of a
proposed regulation be "accompanied by a statement of its basis
and purpose" including a summary of "(A) the factual data on
which the proposed rule is based; (B) the methodology used in ob-
taining the data and in analyzing the data; and (C) the major legal
interpretations and policy considerations underlying the proposed
rule." 270
In addition to the opportunity to submit "written comments,
data, or documentary information" on a proposed rule, section
307(d)(5) requires "an opportunity for the oral presentation of data,
views, or arguments." 271 All comments received, the transcript of
any hearings, and newly available documents "of central relevance
265 486 F.2d at 394. It did not apply this rule to the case before it because
a remand was necessary on other grounds.
266 See Currie & Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action:
Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLum. L. lEv. 1, 48 (1975).
267See Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Applicabil-
ity: The Need for Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CAL".
L. EEv. 1276, 1277 (1972).
26842 U.S.C. §7607(d)(1)(C) (Supp. II 1978).
269Id. §7607(d)(1).
27oId. §7607(d)(3).
271Id. § 7607(d) (5).
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to the rulemaking," together with certain other specified ma-
terials,2 7 2 are to be placed in a "rulemaking docket" 273 open to
public inspection,274 and the record shall be kept "open for thirty
days after completion of the proceeding ... for submission of re-
buttal and supplementary information." 275 This last requirement
was inserted in conference as a "substitute for cross-examination,"
which would have been provided by the House bill.276 The regu-
lation "may not be based (in part or whole) on any information
which has not been placed in the docket" by the time of promulga-
tion.277 The rule itself is to be accompanied by a revised "state-
ment of basis and purpose" as provided for a proposed rule, by
"an explanation of the reasons for any major changes" from the
proposal, and by "a response to each of the significant comments,
criticisms, and new data submitted . . . during the comment
period." 278
The materials designated by section 307(d) constitute the ex-
clusive record for judicial review, 270 and no "objection" that was
not made "during the period for public comment" may be raised
during judicial review,280 but the EPA shall reopen the proceeding
to consider objections that were "impracticable to raise" earlier if
they are "of central relevance to the outcome of the rule." 281
Procedural errors, however, are to be grounds for setting regulations
aside only if the failure was "arbitrary or capricious" and so "cen-
tral" that "there is a substantial likelihood that the rule would have
been significantly changed if such errors had not been made." 282
This complicated procedural framework is a careful response
to the felt inadequacies of the traditional notice-and-comment pro-
cedure, and is designed to afford more meaningful opportunity for
272Id. § 7607(d) (4) (B). The additional materials are those relating to inter-
agency review of regulatory proposals. Id. § 7607(d)(4)(B)(ii).
2781d. § 7607(d)(2).
2741d. §7607(d)(4)(A).
275Id. §7607(d)(5). The reference to the "proceeding" is ambiguous.
Although the Conference Report translates it as "hearing," H.R. RESP. No. 564,
supra note 221, at 177-78, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONe. & An. NEws at
1558, the underlying purpose to allow rebuttal suggests it is not limited to the oral
hearing but refers to the entire "comment period" prescribed under § 307(d)(3).
276 H.R. REP. No. 564, supra note 221, at 177-78, reprinted in [1977] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 1558. See H.R. REP. No. 294, supra note 17, at
320-21, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws at 1399-1400.
27742 U.S.C. §7607(d)(6)(C) (Supp. Il 1978).
2781d. §7607(d)(6)(A), (B).
2791d. §7607(d)(7)(A).
280Id. § 7607(d) (7) (B).
281 Id.
282 Id. §7607(d)(8), (9)(D).
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public participation without unduly encumbering the administra-
tive process. It builds heavily on the Portland Cement opinion
and on a proposal put forward by EPA attorney William Peder-
sen. 283 How it will work in practice remains to be seen, but I view
it as a major step forward.
The disclosure requirement, I have already argued,284 is in-
dispensable to give content to the opportunity to comment, and the
duty to respond to devastating criticisms is a useful means of
assuring adequate support for the regulations. The drafting of
the latter provision may cause some difficulty. On the one hand
it requires responses only to information received "during the com-
ment period," which may not include the thirty-day opportunity
for rebuttal to be afforded "after the completion of the proceed-
ing." Although there obviously should be an end to the proceed-
ing,285 a statement drafted at the time of promulgation should
respond to all that was submitted during the authorized prior
proceedings.
On the other hand, while the Portland Cement opinion re-
quired a response only with respect to "matters identified as po-
tentially significant by the court order" of remand, section 307 (d)
requires a response to "each of the significant comments, criticisms,
and new data submitted." If broadly construed, this provision
could impose an overwhelming burden. The House Report
warned against overenforcement but left much room for interpreta-
tion:
While these statements need not be exhaustive or respond
to every argument regardless of weight, they must be of
sufficient depth and complexity to show that the Admin-
istrator did consider public comments . . . and to permit
any court reviewing the rule under section 307 (b) to be
fairly apprised of the basis for the Administrator's
action.-2 6
Because Portland Cement forms the backdrop of this requirement,
it would seem appropriate to take the court's words as guidelines
for interpreting the statutory term "significant":
283 Pedersen, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38
(1975). See H.R. REP. No. 294, supra note 17, at 319, reprinted in [1977] U.S.
CODE CoNe. & AD. NE-ws at 1398.
284 See text accompanying note 252 supra.
285 See South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, 658-59 (1st Cir. 1974).
2 86 H.R. REP. No. 294, supra note 17, at 321, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 1400.
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[C]omments must be significant enough to step over a
threshold requirement of materiality before any lack of
agency response or consideration becomes of concern. The
comment cannot merely state that a particular mistake
was made in a sampling operation; it must show why the
mistake was of possible significance in the results of the
test.287
It will be useful to bear in mind that the principal criticism to
which the court required a response was a well-documented argu-
ment that the EPA test on which the regulation was chiefly based
had misreported achievable emissions by a factor of two.288 When
this background is coupled with the generally sensible tradition
of judicial application of administrative findings requirements,
28 9
and with the explicit limitations on procedural reversals in section
307(d) itself, the response provision will probably not prove
unreasonable.
The provision for oral presentation, my experience suggests,
290
is in the absence of cross-examination basically a cosmetic gesture
and is therefore probably not worth the time and expense it entails.
Written rebuttal is an inadequate substitute for the give and take
of cross-examination, 291 but the costs of cross-examination are high,
and the decision to forgo its benefits in general rulemaking under
the Act was surely not unreasonable.
292
Limiting the EPA and the court to consideration of materials
that have been subjected to public scrutiny follows logically from
the disclosure requirement of Portland Cement. The harshness
of that case's dictum against allowing objections that were not
raised before the Agency is ameliorated to some extent by the
statutory exception for objections that could not practicably have
been made.
A safety valve against oppressive administrative burdens is
afforded by section 307 (d)(1)'s incorporation of the APA's per-
287 486 F.2d at 394.
288 Id.
289 See, e.g., Minneapolis & St. L. By. v. United States, 361 U.S. 173 (1959);
Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 581 (1945).
290 See Currie, supra note 99, at 470.
291 Id. 471-72.
29 2 In setting a date for public hearing on proposed new § 111 standards for
power plants the EPA announced that it would allow participants to submit writ-
ten questions for the hearing panel to put to those testifying, as had been done
in the vehicle-emission waiver proceeding in the Harvester case. See International
Harvester Corp. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 630 (D.C. Cir. 1973); 43 Fed.
Reg. 42,184 (1978).
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mission to sidestep the prescribed procedures upon a finding that
"notice and public procedure therein are impracticable, unneces-
sary, or contrary to the public interest." 293 Decisions interpreting
this exception strictly in accord with its narrow purpose2 94 should
be a substantial safeguard against its abuse.
A final 1977 procedural provision is section 317, which requires
a detailed "economic impact assessment" of proposed regulations,
including section 111 standards, but which does not "alter the basis
on which a standard or regulation is promulgated" or "authorize
or require any judicial review ... on the basis of failure to comply
with this section." 295
E. Enforcement and Waiver
Section Il1(e) makes it "unlawful for any owner or operator
of any new source to operate such source in violation of any stand-
ard of performance." 296 Under section 113 (a)(3) the Administrator
"'may" issue an order or bring a civil action against anyone violat-
ing section 111(e),297 and for a "knowing" violation section 113
(c)(1)(C) provides substantial criminal penalties. -2 98  I have dis-
cussed these provisions, which also apply to a variety of other
violations, 299 in another article.300 For present purposes I note
only that in a civil action the court may now impose money pen-
alties as well as an injunction; 801 that the bringing of suit is now
intended to be mandatory in the case of a "major stationary
source"; 302 and that an administrative order may apparently ex-
tend the date for compliance set in the regulation, because in
issuing it the Administrator is to "specify a time for compliance
29342 U.S.C. §7607(d)(1) (Supp. H 1978); 5 U.S.C. §553(b)(B) (1976).
Similarly, § 307(d) is inapplicable to "interpretative rules, general statements of
policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice." 5 U.S.C. § 553
(b) (A) (1976).
294 See, e.g., Texaco, Inc. v. FPC, 412 F.2d 740 (3d Cir. 1969). Compare
Sharon Steel Corp. v. EPA, 597 F.2d 377 (3d Cir. 1979), and United States Steel
Corp. v. EPA, 595 F.2d 207 (5th Cir. 1979), with United States Steel Corp. v.
EPA, 605 F.2d 283 (7th Cir. 1979), for recent applications of this exception in
the context of the Clean Air Act.
29542 U.S.C. § 7617 (Supp. J1 1978).
29Id. § 7411(e).
2971d. § 7413(a)(3).
2981d. §7413(c)(1)(C). Those convicted of offenses under §7413(c)(1)
are also limited by §7606(a) in their ability to enter into federal government
contracts.
299 See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7412(c) (Supp. II 1978) (hazardous emissions).
300 Federal Air-Quality Standards, supra note 7, at 398-407.
30142 U.S.C. §7413(b) (Supp. II 1978).
302 Id.
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which the Administrator determines is reasonable, taking into
account the seriousness of the violation and any good faith efforts
to comply."303 Under section 304(a)(1) "any person" may also
sue to enforce an "emission standard or limitation," which ex-
pressly includes "any requirement under section [111] . . . (with-
out regard to whether such requirement is expressed as an emission
standard . . .)." 30
Section 111 itself does not establish a permit system. Section
l10(a) (2) (D) requires that plans for implementing air-quality
standards include a procedure for pre-construction "review ... of
the location of new sources to which a standard of performance
will apply," 305 but the purpose of such review is to assure compli-
ance with ambient standards, not with section 111. 3011 The 1977
amendments, however, impose two permit requirements that effec-
tively provide for pre-construction determination of compliance
with section 111 by most "major" sources. Where the air is cleaner
than that prescribed by the ambient standards, section 165 (a) re-
quires major new sources to obtain construction permits, and one
requisite for issuance of a permit is that the facility will not violate
any "emission standard or standard of performance" under the
Act.307  Where ambient standards are violated, section 172(b)(6)
requires a similar permit, for whose issuance section 173 (2) de-
mands a showing of compliance with "the lowest achievable emis-
sion rate," which must be at least as demanding as the section 111
standard.3 08
Section 114 authorizes the Administrator to require regulated
operators to monitor, sample, keep records, and submit reports.
The Administrator is also authorized to enter premises (subject to
constitutional warrant requirements) 309 and run his own tests in
order to determine compliance with various provisions, including
303Id. §7413(a)(4). See Federal Air-Quality Standards, supra note 7, at
404-05. The 1977 amendment precluding this construction in the case of imple-
mentation plans, 42 U.S.C. § 7410(i) (Supp. II 1978) does not apply to § 111
cases.
30442 U.S.C. §7604(a)(1), (f)(3) (Supp. II 1978).
305 Id. § 7410(a) (2) (D).
306 Id. § 7410(a)(4). The House Committee in 1977 would have required
in addition a showing of compliance with § 111. See H.R. REP. No. 294, supra
note 17, at 360. A district court confused the two issues in Sierra Club v. Drain,
11 E.R.C. 1173, 1174-75 (D. Neb. 1976), finding that a new source would not
cause an ambient violation because its emissions would meet the § 111 performance
standard.
30742 U.S.C. §7475(a)(1), (3) (Supp. H 1978).
3081d. §§7502(b)(6), 7503(2), 7501(3).
309 See Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (warrant required
for OSHA search).
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section 111.310 The regulations implement this authority, requir-
ig, among other things, the submission of reports of a performance
test soon after operation begins.311
Under section 116 the states are not pre-empted by statute from
adopting and enforcing new-source performance standards of their
own, so long as they are not "less stringent" than applicable federal
standards.312 Section 111(c)(1), moreover, authorizes the Admin-
istrator to "delegate" to a state that utilizes "adequate procedures"
his authority to implement and enforce the federal standards "for
new sources located in such State." 313 The aim of this provision,
as explained in connection with an earlier draft that would have
imposed a compliance certification procedure, was to shift some of
the enforcement burden to the states: "It is expected that every
effort will be made to have States assume this responsibility." 314
Substantively it seems to add little to the law, because states are free
to enforce identical standards under section 116 315 and because
section 111(c)(2) wisely provides that "[n]othing in this subsection
shall prohibit the Administrator from enforcing any applicable
standard of performance." 316 The provision may serve to call at-
tention to the desirability of state enforcement, and a "delegation"
should relieve the Administrator from the obligation of enforcement
under section 113(b)317 against major sources, which otherwise
would require a duplication of enforcement efforts, contrary to the
statutory purpose. A number of delegations have in fact been made,
typically providing that the state shall have "primary responsibility"
for enforcement but that if it "acts in a manner inconsistent with
the terms of this delegation, EPA may exercise its concurrent en-
forcement authority." 318
Section 111(j) authorizes the Administrator to grant waivers
from new-source standards "to encourage the use of an innovative
technological system . . . of continuous emission reduction." 319
31042 U.S.C. § 7414(a) (Supp. H 1978).
31140 C.F.R. §60.8 (1979). See also, id., §§60.7 (notification and record
keeping); 60.45 (monitoring of power-plant emissions).
31242 U.S.C. §7416 (Supp. H 1978).
313 Id. § 7411 (e)(1).
314 S. REP. No. 1196, supra note 14, at 18.
315 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (Supp. I 1978).
316 Id. § 7411(c) (2).
3171d. § 7413(b).
318 See, e.g., 42 Fed. Reg. 62,197 (Puerto Rico), 64,735 (Kentucky). Though
the 1977 amendments omitted the pre-existing ban on delegation of authority over
emissions from federal facilities, these delegations continue to except such facilities.
31942 U.S.C. §7411(j)(1)(A) (Supp. H 1978).
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Similar provisions are found in connection with motor-vehicle
standards 320 and implementation plans,321 but there are differences.
As in the case of implementation plans, there must be a showing
that the system is likely to do a better job than that otherwise re-
quired. 22 The system must not create "an unreasonable risk to
public health, welfare, or safety," 323 and the waiver must be on
conditions adequate to assure that "emissions from the source will
not prevent attainment . . . of any national ambient air quality
standards." 324 Practicable interim measures must be taken to re-
duce interim emissions.325 There must be "notice and opportunity
for public hearing," 326 which for reasons given elsewhere I would
construe to be an adjudicatory hearing.327 Waivers are renewable,
but no waiver may extend the date more than seven years beyond
"the date on which any waiver is granted" to the source or four
years after "any portion" of a source "commences operation, which-
ever is earlier." 328 This seems to mean that the total waiver period,
including all renewals, cannot exceed seven years. In short, the
waiver provisions are quite detailed, and the discrepancies in lan-
guage among the three similar sections can only serve to exacerbate
the burden of interpretation.
32 9
F. Revision
The original section 111(b) blandly provided, in apparently
discretionary terms, that the Administrator "may, from time to time
revise" new-source performance standards.330 Consequently, when
affected citizens sued in Oljato Chapter of the Navajo Tribe v.
3201d. §7521(b)(6)(A).
321Id. § 7413(d)(4).
322 Id. § 7411(j) (1)(A)(ii).
323Id. § 7411(j)(1)(A)(iii).
3241d. § 7411(j) (1) (B) (i).
325 Id. § 7411( )(.2)(B).
326 1d. § 7411 (j) (1) (A).
327 See Mobile-Source Provisions, supra note 7, at 837-47. The decision in
Costle v. Pacific Legal Foundation, 100 S. Ct. 1095 (1980), construing a com-
parable permit provision in the Clean Water Act so as not to require an adjudica-
tory hearing in the absence of a timely request or a showing that relevant facts
were in dispute, does not detract from this conclusion.
32842 U.S.C. §7411(j)(1)(E) (Supp. II 1978).
329 Despite statutory references to waivers for "proposed" sources, the Seventh
Circuit has held that a § 111() waiver may be applied for after the source has
begun operation because "startup per se has no substantive significance to waiver
eligibility," and because the EPA had conceded that application could be made
during construction. Central Ill. Pub. Serv. Co. v. EPA, 594 F.2d 636 (7th Cir.
1979).
33042 U.S.C. § 1857c-6(b)(1)(B) (1976).
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Train 331 to compel the Administrator to revise the section 111
power-plant standards, the statutory language suggested that the
challenge lacked merit.
The court, however, found a statutory basis for a duty of re-
vision in section 307(b), which limited the time for judicial review
of regulations except when the "petition is based solely on grounds
arising after" the usual review deadline.332 Citing the Senate
Report, the court held that this provision was intended "to provide
a legal mechanism . . . to assure that standards were revised when-
ever necessary." 33 The Senate Report states that
[I]t is clear that new information will be developed and
that such information may dictate a revision or modifica-
tion of any promulgated standard or regulation established
under the act. The judicial review section, therefore, pro-
vides that any person may challenge any promulgated
standard, regulation, or approved or promulgated imple-
mentation plan after the date of promulgation whenever
it is alleged that significant new information has become
available. 3
4
This was a most unexpected conclusion. On reflection, how-
ever, it is not easy to visualize how "grounds arising after" the
review deadline can be relevant to the validity of the original regu-
lation unless, as the court held in Oljato, the regulation must be
revised as technology improves. However awkward the phrasing,
this is not such an implausible rendering of the statutory language
as to justify ignoring such a clear statement of legislative intent.
The court was probably right in Oljato, but the statute was in dire
need of amendment: a judicial review provision ought not be made
to bear the weight of an implicit duty of revision that contradicts
the apparently plain words of another section of the same statute.
The 1977 amendments, responsive to this concern, make re-
vision mandatory when appropriate: "The Administrator shall, at
least every four years, review and, if appropriate, revise such stand-
ards . . ... 33 A mechanism for enforcing this duty is provided
by a new section 111(g), which requires revisions of specified types
331515 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
33242 U.S.C. §7607(b)(1) (Supp. 11 1978).
833 515 F.2d at 660. Accord, Union Elec. Co. v. EPA, 515 F.2d 206 (8th Cir.
1975) (dictum), aff'd, 427 U.S. 246 (1976).
334 S. REP. No. 1196, supra note 14, at 41-42.
33542 U.S.C. §7411(b)(1)(B) (Supp. 11 1978).
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upon application by "the Governor of a State." 331 It would be odd
if this procedure were held to be exclusive, since the amendments
appear to have been designed to reinforce the duty of revision, not
to limit avenues of enforcing it provided elsewhere in the Act. The
Oljato route of private actions by affected citizens appears to re-
main open.
G. Existing Sources
The performance standards to be adopted under section 111 (b)
apply only to "new" sources. 337 Sources of pollution in existence
before the proposal date of such standards are subject to regulation
under the provisions relating to "hazardous" pollutants (section
112) 338 or plans for implementing ambient standards (sections 108-
110).83 9  Section 111 (d), however, provides additional authority
for regulation of certain existing sources.
There are two threshold requirements for regulation under
section 111(d). First, the emission must be one "to which a stand-
ard of performance under ... [subsection (b) of this section] would
apply if such existing source were a new source"; second, the pol-
lutant must not be already regulated under sections 108 or 112.340
The states are invited to submit "plan[s]" establishing and pro-
viding for enforcement of "standards of performance" applicable
to such emissions.341  The Administrator has "the same authority
... to prescribe a plan ... where the State fails to submit a satis-
factory plan" and "to enforce the provisions of such plan ... where
the State fails to enforce them as he would have" in the case of a
plan for implementing federal air-quality standards.
3 42
The original section 111(d) was apparently silent as to the
criteria against which to determine whether the state standards
3361d. § 7411(g) (4).
3371d. § 7411 (a) (2).
338 Id. § 7412. See text accompanying notes 354-403 infra.
33942 U.S.C. §7410 (Supp. H 1978).
340Id. § 7411(d) (1). Thus, the draft guidelines for standards governing kraft
pulp mills apply only to reduced sulfur (H 2S, mercaptans, etc.) and not to
particulate matter, for which new-source standards have been adopted, 43 Fed.
Reg. 7,568 (1978), but which is also subject to ambient standards. See 43 Fed.
Reg. 7,597 (1978).
34142 U.S.C. §7411(d)(1) (Supp. 11 1978).
342Id. §7411(d)(2)(A), (B). Cf. §§7410(c), 7413(a). Because federal
enforcement of the latter type of plan is not limited to cases in which the state
"fails to enforce," see Federal Air-Quality Standards, supra note 7, at 398-99, 399
n.160, this reference is unfortunate. The explicit analogy suggests that "such
plan," which the EPA may enforce, is the § 111(d) plan whether adopted by the
state or by the Administrator.
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were "satisfactory." 243 The EPA regulations implementing section
111(d) required that, in the case of a pollutant found to endanger
public health, the standards be "no less stringent than the cor-
responding emission guideline (s) specified in subpart C of this
part," absent a showing of "unreasonable cost," "physical impos-
sibility," or "[o]ther factors . . . that make . . . a less stringent
standard . . . significantly more reasonable" in a particular case
or for any class of facilities.344 This formula on its face gave the
states plenty of latitude, but as late as 1977 no guidelines at all
were to be found in "Subpart C." 345 Section 111(d) was a dead
letter.
It was not surprising that in 1977 Congress found a need "to
clarify the basis for standard-setting for existing sources under sec-
tion 111(d)." 346 The result was a new definition of "standard of
performance" for purposes of section 111(d):
a standard . . . which reflects the degree of emission re-
duction achievable through the application of the best
system of continuous emission reduction which (taking
into consideration the cost of achieving such emission
reduction, and any nonair quality health and environ-
mental impact and energy requirements) . . . has been
adequately demonstrated for that category of sources.M7
Perhaps this definition looks familiar. Essentially it adopts
the same best-practicable-control approach that section 111 has
always applied to new sources. There are explicit differences, how-
ever. While the "best system" for existing sources must be one
of "continuous" emission reduction, it need not be a "techno-
logical" one.348 Further, no "percentage reduction" in uncon-
trolled emissions is required for existing fuel-burning sources. This
means, for example, that a switch to low-sulfur fuel may be found
34342 U.S.C. § 1857c-6(d) (1976). Arguably the same definition of "standard
of performance" governed as in the case of new sources, see text accompanying
note 93 supra, but until 1977 § 111(d) referred not to "standards of performance"
but to "emission standards." 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6(d) (1976).
34440 C.F.R. § 60.24(c), (f) (1979). Where only "public welfare" was at
stake, the states were given freedom to "balance" the guideline information against
"other factors of public concern." Id. § 60.24(d).
345 See 40 C.F.R., Parts 60 to 99 (1977), at 24.
346 H.R. REP. No. 294, supra note 17, at 195, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & An. NEws at 1274.
34742 U.S.C. §7411(a)(1)(C) (Supp. H 1978).
348 See H.R. REP. No. 294, supra note 17, at 195, reprinted in [1977] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 1274.
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sufficient for existing sources, though not for new sources.349 Even
apart from the fuel question, the statute does not require a de-
termination that the "best system" for existing sources be the same
as that for new ones. Section 111 (d) expressly allows the states
(and requires the Administrator in case of a federal plan) to "take
into consideration . . . the remaining useful life" of a particular
source.350 Moreover, the insistence on adequate demonstration
"for that category of sources," which has no counterpart in the
new-source definition, seems to emphasize that the added costs of
retrofitting existing sources, of which Congress was aware,3 51 may
be sufficient to make the standards appropriate for them more
lenient than those for new sources. 352 The EPA has begun to
promulgate guidelines for section 111(d) plans, and the first plans,
for fluorine from fertilizer plants, were due by December 1, 1977.
353
II. "HAZARDOUS" AIR POLLUTANTS
Section 112 of the Act, also adopted in 1970,354 provides for
federal adoption of "emission standards" for "hazardous" air pol-
lutants, to be set "at the level which... provides an ample margin
of safety to protect the public health." 355 Interesting and difficult
questions are posed by this provision. Before they are addressed a
few of its less controversial features will be noted.
A "hazardous" pollutant is defined in section 112(a)(1) as one
"to which no ambient air quality standard is applicable and which
in the judgment of the Administrator causes, or contributes to,
air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to result in an
increase in mortality or an increase in serious irreversible, or in-
capacitating reversible, illness." 356 This is the formula inserted
349 Cf. text accompanying notes 209-34 supra.
35042 U.S.C. §7411(d)(1), (2) (Supp. 11 1978).
351 See H.R. REP. No. 294, supra note 17, at 185, reprinted in [1977] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 1264.
352 Thus the § 111(d) draft guidelines for existing kraft pulp mills are less
stringent in several respects than the performance standards for new mills.
Compare 43 Fed. Reg. 7,597 (1978) (20 ppm reduced sulfur from existing lime
kilns and recovery furnaces) with id. at 7568 (8 and 5 ppm from new lime kilns
and recovery furnaces, respectively). Moreover, the guidelines permit up to six
years to retrofit certain controls. Id. 7598.
3 53 See 42 Fed. Reg. 12,022 (1977). See also id. at 55,797 (sulfuric-acid
mist); 43 Fed. Reg. 7,597 (1978) (reduced sulfur from pulp mills (draft)).
354Pub. L. No. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676, 1685 (1970) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§ 7412 (Supp. II 1978)).
35542 U.S.C. §7412(b)(1)(A), (B) (1976).
356 Id. § 7412(a) (1). Cf. the provision for effluent standards for "toxic" water
pollutants under § 307 of the 1972 water-pollution statute, 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)
(1976), which applied to "those pollutants ... which .. .will . . .cause death,
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in various sections in 1977 to approve the cautionary approach
espoused by the en banc decision in the Ethyl case,357 modified
to emphasize that under section 112 the "nature of risk must be
more serious than under other sections.3 58  Although on its face
this definition could apply to almost any pollutant in high enough
concentrations, legislative history indicates that the original inten-
tion was far narrower. Explaining an earlier draft that had speci-
fied that the contaminant must be harmful when present in "trace
concentrations," the Senate Committee said that the provision
would "encompass a limited number of pollutants," and listed the
particularly poisonous pollutants asbestos, cadmium, beryllium, and
mercury.359 Omission of the "trace" language arguably suggests
that the statute as adopted may be broader. But the Conference
Report reflects no decision to broaden coverage,3 60 and to hold
that the EPA may set emission standards for all pollutants would
so undermine the declaration in section 101(a)(3) that "the preven-
tion and control of air pollution at its source is the primary re-
sponsibility of States and local governments" 361 that it ought not
lightly to be inferred. The EPA has so far taken a modest view of
its powers under section 112. In 1973 it promulgated emission
standards for asbestos, beryllium, and mercury. 62 It added vinyl
chloride in 1976 363 and has since included benzene 364 and radionu-
clides865 on the list of substances to be regulated.
In contrast to the provision for air-quality standards, there is
no requirement that a "hazardous" pollutant come "from numer-
ous or diverse mobile or stationary sources"; 366 by defining a
"hazardous" pollutant as one "to which no ambient air-quality
standard is applicable," the statute seems to indicate a preference
for the flexibility of the implementation-plan approach when con-
disease, behavioral abnormalities, cancer, genetic mutations, physiological mal-
functions ... or physical deformations." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(13) (1976).
357 See note 70 supra and text accompanying notes 69-70 supra.
358 H.R. REP. No. 294, supra note 17, at 50, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 1128.
359 S. REP. No. 1196, supra note 14, at 20.
360 H.R. REP. No. 1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1970).
36142 U.S.C. §7401(a)(3) (Supp. II 1978).
36238 Fed. Reg. 8,820 (1973), 40 C.F.R. §§ 61.20-61.34; 61.50-61.55 (1979).
36341 Fed. Reg. 46,564 (1976), 40 C.F.R. §§ 61.60-61.71 (1979).
36442 Fed. Reg. 29,332 (1977). Despite the time limits of § 112(b)(1)(B),
the first of several benzene standards was not proposed until April 1980, 45 Fed.
Reg. 26,660, and the EPA's published timetable called for adoption of the last
benzene regulation in August 1981. See 45 Fed. Reg. 16,837 (1980).
36544 Fed. Reg. 76,738 (1979).
36642 U.S.C. §7408(a)(1)(B) (Supp. H 1978).
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trol options are multiplied by the existence of numerous sources.
In contrast to section 111, standards for "hazardous" pollutants are
to apply to existing as well as to new sources, 367 in evident recogni-
tion of the extreme dangers they were intended to combat. As in
the case of section 111, only "stationary" sources must comply; 365
mobile sources are left to the separate provisions of Title II and to
air-quality standards.
Adoption of hazardous-pollutant standards is mandatory after
a pollutant is included on a "list" under section 112(b)(1). 369  In
providing that the Administrator "shall" list "each hazardous air
pollutant for which he intends to establish an emission standard,"
the statute appears to confer broad discretion.370 Identical lan-
guage in regard to air-quality standards, however, has been con-
strued by the Second Circuit to impose a duty to list all pollutants
meeting the statutory criteria, in order to give meaning to the word
"shall." 371 There is no basis for distinguishing section 112. The
list itself "shall" be revised from time to time, but nothing is said
of revising standards once they have been adopted. I would expect
that the courts would find an implicit authority to revise the
standards, and that the District of Columbia Circuit would apply
to section 112 its holding in the Oliato case that section 307(b)
provides an avenue for compelling revision where appropriate on
"grounds arising after" the normal period for judicial review.372
Unlike section 111, section 112 requires a "public hearing"
before adoption of standards, 373 presumably because of the greater
stakes involved. The 1977 amendments attempt to make the dis-
tinction purely nominal by subjecting both section 111 "standard[s]
of performance" and section 112 "emission standard[s]" to a com-
plex new set of rulemaking procedures, 374 discussed above,375 which
include the right to make an "oral presentation." 376
An "emission standard" under section 112 "shall become effec-
tive upon promulgation." 377 Thereafter, "no air pollutant . . .
367Id. §7412(c)(1).
3681d. §7412(a)(2), (e)(1).
369 Unless the Administrator subsequently finds the pollutant "clearly" is not
"hazardous." 42 U.S.C. §7412(b)(1)(A), (B) (Supp. II 1978).
3701d. §7412(b)(1)(A).
371 See text accompanying notes 78-82 supra.
372 See text accompanying notes 330-336 supra.
373 Compare 42 U.S.C. §7412(b)(1)(B) (Supp. II 1978) with id. §7411
(b)(1)(B).3741Id. § 7607(d) (1) (C).
375 See text accompanying notes 267-95 supra.
37642 US.C. § 7607(d)(5)(ii) (Supp. II 1978).
377ld. § 7412(b) (1) (C).
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may be emitted from any stationary source in violation of such
standard," 378 except that "an existing source" is given a ninety-
day grace period. 79 Recognizing that this period may be far less
than what is required to install sophisticated control equipment, 80
section 112(c)(1)(B)(ii) allows the Administrator to extend it in
individual cases up to two years after the effective date "if he finds
that such period is necessary for the installation of controls and
that steps will be taken during the period of the waiver to assure
that the health of persons will be protected from imminent en-
dangerment." 381
The criteria for waiver are procrustean: the maximum two-year
period for waiver may be too short in some cases, 38 2 and any hazard
short of "imminent endangerment" may be permitted if time is re-
quired for installation, even if the cost of an immediate shutdown
is trivial.3 3 Yet the statute says that a waiver "may," not "shall,"
be granted; apparently the Administrator has power to impose addi-
tional requirements.384 Nevertheless he should not feel free simply
to refuse to grant any waivers at all; Congress seems to have con-
templated that hardship sometimes would justify postponement. It
would have been far better to require that a waiver be granted upon
proof of unreasonable hardship. Further, requiring a case-by-case
determination for every source seems on its face likely to be admin-
istratively burdensome because substantial construction is generally
likely to take more than ninety days. Although no flood of waiver
requests has appeared under the few existing regulations, I would
have preferred to let the EPA set compliance dates for existing
facilities in regulations applicable to entire categories of sources,
with an additional safety valve for cases of individual hardship.
3781d. § 7412(c) (1) (B).
379Id. § 7412(c) (1) (B) (i). "New" and "existing" sources are defined sub-
stantially as they are in §111. Id., §7412(a)(2), (3); 40 C.F.R. §61.02 (1979)
(proposed amendment, 44 Fed. Reg. 31,596 (1979)).
380 The EPA has estimated, for example, that the typical time required to
design and install sulfur-dioxide scrubbing equipment runs from 27 to 36 months.
See REPORT OF HEAPING PANEL, NATroNAL PUBLic HEAnINGS ON POWEuPLANT
ComP..ANcE WrnH SuLuth OnDiz Ain POLLUMON REGULATIONS 3 (1974).
88142 U.S.C. §7412(c)(1)(B)(ii) (Supp. 11 1978).
s382 See note 380 supra.
383 While it is conversely true that "imminent endangerment" will block a
waiver regardless of the most devastating consequences of shutdown (barring
national security, see text accompanying note 389 infra), the "steps" to prevent
endangerment in such a case could conceivably include evacuation.
384 The regulations may go further than the statute requires by providing for
conditions "to assure protection of the health of persons" without mention of
"imminent endangerment," and they repeat the discretionary word "may." 40
C.F.R. § 61.11(b)(3), (a) (1979).
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The statute is silent as to procedure for waiver. The regula-
tions provide for submission of a detailed waiver request, with
opportunity "to present . . . additional information or argument"
in response to a "[n]otice of the information and findings" on which
the Administrator proposes to deny the application. 3 5 Unfortu-
nately, nothing is said of participation by the affected public. The
format for "additional information or argument" is not specified;
the language suggests that the EPA does not contemplate routine
full adjudicative hearings, which would appear appropriate when-
ever facts peculiar to the applicant are in issue,388 as the criteria
suggest will often be the case. The apparently discretionary nature
of the waiver provision, however, probably means there is no such
entitlement to relief as would make due-process constraints ap-
plicable. 87
There is no waiver provision here, as there is in section 111,388
for innovative technology, presumably because of the extremely
hazardous nature of the pollutants to be regulated. Section
1 12(c)(2), however, allows the President to exempt any source for a
renewable two-year period "if he finds that the technology to im-
plement such standards is not available and the operation of such
source is required for reasons of national security." 389 Again
nothing is said of a hearing; again the authority appears largely
discretionary. Further, the criteria may be too narrow: arguably
technology is "available" even if its cost is, under the circumstances,
excessive. 90
Enforcement machinery is in large part the same as for section
111.391 Violations of section 112(c) may be the subject of admin-
istrative orders or government actions for injunction and civil
penalties.892  Criminal sanctions are provided for "knowing" vio-
lations,8 93 and private actions may be brought to enforce "any re-
quirement" under section 112.304
Unlike section 111, however, section 112(c) contains an addi-
tional provision prohibiting the construction of a new source, or
38s540 C.F.B. §§ 61.10-.11 (1979).
886 See note 327 supra.
3871d.
3 88 See text accompanying notes 319-329 supra.
38942 U.S.C. § 7412 (c)(2) (Supp. 111978).
390 Cf. Federal Air-Quality Standards, supra note 7, at 380-81.
391 See text accompanying notes 296-318 supra.
39242 U.S.C. § 7413(a)(3), (b)(3) (Supp. H 1978).
393 Id. § 7413(c) (1) (C).
394 Id. § 7604(a) (1), (f) (3).
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the modification of an existing one, "which in the Administrator's
judgment, will emit an air pollutant to which such standard applies
unless the Administrator finds that such source if properly operated
will not cause emissions in violation of such standard." 395 Though
confusingly phrased, this provision appears to establish a pre-con-
struction clearance requirement essentially indistinguishable from a
permit system,396 and that is the way the EPA administers it. The
Agency's regulations forbid construction of "any stationary source
subject to [any] . . . standard" without prior "written approval of
the Administrator." 29r On submission of an "application for ap-
proval" containing pertinent information, the Administrator deter-
mines whether or not, "if properly operated," the facility will "cause
emissions in violation of a standard." If the Administrator proposes
to deny the application, he must give the applicant "notice of the
information and findings on which such intended denial is
based." 398 As in the case of waivers for existing sources, it seems
unfortunate that no provision is made for participation in the
permit process by members of the public who may be affected by
the proposed discharge. Moreover, since the regulations confer a
right to approval upon meeting the requisite conditions, the "op-
portunity . . . to present . . . additional information or argu-
ments" 399 should be construed to require a full adjudicative hearing
on facts peculiar to the applicant in order to avoid unconstitution-
ality.400
As under section 111,401 state standards are preempted only if
they are "less stringent" than the federal.402 The Administrator
may "delegate" to a state authority to enforce federal "emission
standards," while retaining the right to enforce them himself. 403
A. "Emission Standards"
Asbestos, now recognized as a highly dangerous air pollutant,
404
has been widely used in building construction for fireproofing and
395 Id. § 7412 (c) (1) (A).
396 Moreover, one requirement for issuance of permits for major new sources
in clean areas is employment of control technology that may not be less effective
than that required by standards under §112. Id. §§7475(a)(1), (4), 7479(3).
39740 C.F.R. §§ 61.05, 61.07-.08 (1979).
398 ld. §§ 61.07-08.
3991d. §61.08(c)(2) (1979).400 See note 327 supra.
401 See text accompanying note 312 supra.
402 42 U.S.C. § 7416 (Supp. II 1978).
403id. §7412(d)(1), (2). He has done so. See note 318 supra.
404 See, e.g., Horvitz, Asbestos and Its Environmental Impact, 3 ENVT'L AFF.
145 (1974).
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insulation. The demolition of buildings therefore creates a risk
that asbestos fibers will be emitted into the atmosphere. The his-
tory of administrative attempts to regulate asbestos emissions pro-
vides an interesting example of the pitfalls created by the language
of the Clean Air Act.
Asbestos was one of the first three pollutants the Administrator
addressed under section 112,405 and the standard he first proposed
would have prohibited all "visible emissions" of asbestos "resulting
from the repair or demolition of any building or structure, other
than a single family dwelling." 406 Because "it would be imprac-
ticable, if not impossible, to do such work without creating visible
emissions," 407 the rule as adopted was modified to avoid outlawing
demolition. Because "satisfactory means of measuring asbestos
emissions are still unavailable," 408 the rule prescribed work prac-
tices rather than a numerical standard: "Friable asbestos material,
used to insulate or fireproof any boiler, pipe, or load-supporting
structural member, shall be wetted and removed . . .before wreck-
ing . . . is commenced." 409 In Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United
States410 the Supreme Court struck down this requirement: section
112 authorized the adoption only of "emission standards," and this
was not an emission standard.
At the time the Adamo case arose, the statute did not define
"emission standards," except for purposes of citizen suits brought
under section 304.411 While that definition was largely tautologi-
cal,412 its inclusion of a "control or prohibition respecting a motor
vehicle fuel" illustrated a congressional understanding that the term
might encompass more than a direct numerical limitation on emis-
sions. The Supreme Court, however, held that "emission standard"
405 See text accompanying note 362 supra.
40636 Fed. Reg. 23,242 (1971).
40738 Fed. Reg. 8,821 (1973).
408 Id. 8,820.
4091d. 8,829 (§ 61.22(d)(2)(i)). For the current version of these require-
ments, see 40 C.F.R. § 61.22(d) (4)-.22(d) (6) (1979).
410434 U.S. 275, 289 (1978).
41142 U.S.C. §1857h-2(f) (1970) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §7604(f)
(Supp. II 1978)).
412 For purposes of this section, the term "emission standard or limitation
under this chapter" means-
(1) a schedule or timetable of compliance, emission limitation,
standard of performance or emission standard, or
(2) a control or prohibition respecting a motor vehicle fuel or fuel
additive,
which is in effect under this chapter ....
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in section 112 had a narrower meaning: "[A] standard is a quanti-
tative 'level' to be attained by use of 'techniques,' 'controls,' and
'technology' "413 (such as the simultaneously adopted limitation of
emissions from chlor-alkali plants to "2300 grams of mercury per
24-hour period").414
This was an extraordinarily hostile interpretation. As Mr.
Justice Stevens pointed out in his dissent, "[t]he effect of the regu-
lation is to curtail the quantity of asbestos which is emitted into
the open air during demolition." 415 Indeed, the regulation itself
had required that certain "procedures," including wetting, "be
used to prevent emissions of particulate asbestos material." 416 1
should have thought the term "emission standard" had been chosen
to indicate that, in contrast to the air-quality standards authorized
by section 109,417 section 112 standards were to focus on reducing
emissions at their source. As the Stevens dissent argued, it is dif-
ficult to believe that in using the term "emission standard" Con-
gress meant to preclude measures to reduce the emission of
hazardous pollutants for which measurement techniques were poorly
developed.418
The Court relied on clauses of section 112 that it thought
"distinguish[ed] between emission standards and the techniques
to be utilized in achieving" them.419 For example, the Admin-
istrator may grant a temporary waiver if "necessary for the installa-
tion of controls," 420 and the President may grant such a waiver if
"the technology to implement such standards is not available." 42
Finally, the Administrator is to issue information on "control tech-
niques," 422 and standards are to be set "at the level which . . .
provides an ample margin of safety." 23
413 434 U.S. at 286.
41438 Fed. Beg. 8,832 (1973) (codified at 40 C.F.B. § 61.52(a) (1979)).
415434 U.S. at 295 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Accord, United States v. Big
Chief, Inc., 7 E.R.C. 1840 (E.D. La. 1975), upholding the regulation. "There
appears no justification for restrictively defining 'emission standard' so as to
exclude standards such as this, which undeniably control the amount of ambient
emissions," in light of § 101's expressed purpose "to protect and enhance the
quality of the Nation's air resources ... ." Id. 1843.
41638 Fed. Beg. 8,829 (1973) (§61.22(d)(2)).
41742 U.S.C. § 7409 (Supp. H 1978).
4 18 See 434 U.S. at 293 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
419 Id. 285.
420Id. 286 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §7412(c)(1)(B)(ii) (Supp. 11 1978)).
421Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. §7412(c)(2) (Supp. II 1978)).
422Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. §7412(b)(2) (Supp. 11 1978)).
423 Id. (emphasis in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. §7412(b)(1)(B) (Supp.
11 1978)).
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The obvious fact that "control" and "technology" are not
synonymous with "standards" no more suggests that standards may
not expressly require methods of control than it suggests that they
may not require them indirectly by numerical prescription. And
while the word "level" is abstractly suggestive of a quantitative
standard, the plain purpose of the clause was to ensure that the
standards were stringent enough to protect health; there is no rea-
son to think Congress meant to resolve in such a backhanded way
the unrelated question whether work practices might be prescribed
when quantitative standards were impracticable.
No legislative history was cited to support the Court's decision
that numerical prescription was required. The dissent did concede
that Congress had expressed "a preference for numerical emission
standards," 424 quoting the Senate Committee's statement that the
Agency "should not make a technical judgment as to how the
standard should be implemented" but rather should "determine
the achievable limits and let the owner or operator determine the
most economic acceptable technique to apply." 425 To the dissent
this comment indicated only a "preference," not a rigid require-
ment. The majority did not cite it at all,4 6 probably because it
was made in explanation of the term "standard of performance,"
which appeared in section III but not in section 112.
The Court even refused to defer to the Administrator's con-
struction of "emission standard" as a reasonable one, as it had done
not long before with a more debatable interpretation of section
110.427
Recognizing that the term "emission standard" was susceptible
to the narrow interpretation ultimately rendered by the Supreme
Court,28 Congress in 1977 attempted to close the possible loophole
by adding a new section 112(e): "[I]f in the judgment of the Ad-
ministrator, it is not feasible to prescribe or enforce an emission
standard for control of a hazardous air pollutant or pollutants, he
may instead promulgate a design, equipment, work practice, or
operational standard, or combination thereof .... 429 The House
424Id. 298 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
425 S. REP. No. 1196, supra note 14, at 17.
426 It did, however, cite a 1977 Senate Report to similar effect. 434 U.S. at
289 (1978). Mr. Justice Stevens criticized the majority's reliance on the 1977
document to interpret prior congressional action. Id. 303-05 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting).
427 See Train v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
428 See S. RPro. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 44 (1977).
429 Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-95, § 110, 91 Stat.
703, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7412(e)(1) (Supp. 11 1978). An emission standard
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Committee remarked that the amendment "would fully authorize
the present Federal regulations governing asbestos." 
430
Although the amendment took effect before the Supreme Court
decision in Adamo, it came too late to apply to the case before the
Court, which was a criminal prosecution for acts done before the
amendment. The Court found in the amendment confirmation of
its interpretation of the original language: by enacting a separate
authorization for work-practice rules, Congress had "endorsed" the
view that they were not "emission standards," and therefore the
EPA's interpretation was not entitled to deference as a reasonable
one.431
Mr. Justice Stevens demolished this argument in his dissent.
He began by questioning "the dubious premise that we can rely
on the 95th Congress to tell us what the 93d had in mind." 432
Just a few years earlier, in fact, the Court had reaffirmed that "post-
passage remarks of legislators, however explicit, cannot serve to
enlarge the legislative intent." 433 Moreover, said the dissent, the
Senate Report in no way "endorsed" the narrow construction, but
merely recognized an ambiguity:
As soon as someone challenged the Administrator's power
to promulgate work practice rules . . . , Congress made it
unambiguously clear that the Administrator had that
power ....
. . . [This] persuasively indicates that, if Congress in
1970 had focused on the latent ambiguity in the term
"emission standard," it would have expressly granted the
authority that the Administrator regarded as implicit in
the statute as written.
43
One might expect, given its history, that the 1977 amendment
would have reduced Adamo to a monument to the difficulty of
is not feasible if "(A) a hazardous pollutant or pollutants cannot be emitted
through a conveyance designed and constructed to emit or capture such pollutant,
. . . or (B) the application of measurement methodology to a particular class of
sources is not practicable due to technological or economic limitations." Id.
§ 7412(e) (2).
430 S. REP. No. 127, supra note 428, at 44.
431 434 U.S. at 288-89.
432Id. 303 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
433Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 132 (1974). The
passage was cited with approval only a few months after Adamo was decided.
Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193 (1978).
434 434 U.S. at 305 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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drafting judge-proof statutes.435 Unfortunately, in burying the
original section 112 the Supreme Court dealt a body blow to the
amendment as well. Although the Administrator was clearly em-
powered to adopt a work-practice standard when an emission stand-
ard was not feasible, he might have been unable to enforce it, for
section 112(c)(1), which gives the standards their teeth, still made
it unlawful only to violate an "emission standard." 436 Mr. Justice
Stevens saw this difficulty as a basis for criticizing the majority's
interpretation of the original section 112: if the work rule is not
an "emission standard," it "will continue to be unenforceable even
if promulgated anew pursuant to the authority expressly set forth
in the 1977 Amendment." 437 The Court appears to have agreed,
noting that while Congress had amended the judicial-review provi-
sion of section 307(b) to include any "requirement under section
112," 438 "Congress has yet to apply this recognition to the enforce-
ment provisions of section 112(c)." 439
The dissent probably overstated the effect of the failure to
amend section 112(c), for "any person" "0 (including a state) may
sue to enforce a work-practice regulation under section 804, which
now defines an "emission standard or limitation" for its own pur-
poses as "any requirement under section . . . 112 (... whether...
expressed as an emission standard or otherwise)." 441 This provi-
sion highlights the absurdity of the statutory scheme as interpreted
by Adamo: it is inconceivable that Congress intended that work-
practice rules be enforceable by private citizens and not by the
EPA.
Nor was the absence of federal enforcement machinery the
only unintended flaw in the statutory provisions for work-practice
standards following Adamo. A "new source" is defined as one
whose construction commences after proposal of "an emission
standard"; 4-2 therefore, sources built after proposal of a "design"
435 See National Ass'n of Demolition Contractors v. Costle, 565 F.2d 748,
751 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1977), in which the industry conceded, prior to Adamo, that
the amendment authorized adoption of work practice rules for the future.
43642 U.S.C. § 7412(c)(1) (Supp. 1 1978).
437434 U.S. at 306 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
43842 U.S.C. §7607(b)(1) (Supp. II 1978).
439 434 U.S. at 286 n.4 (1978).
440 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (Supp. II 1978).
4411d. §7604(f)(3) (Supp. II 1978). The EPA has also noted the im-
portance of this possibility. See 43 Fed. Reg. 26,372 (1978).
Contrast the provisions for federal enforcement, whose sole reference to § 112
is to § 112(c), which includes only "emission standard[s]." 42 U.S.C. §§ 7413
(a)(3), (b)(3), (c)(1)(C) (Supp. II 1978).
44242 U.S.C. §7412(a)(2) (Supp. II 1978).
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or "practice standard" under the 1977 amendment were never new.
Only an "emission standard" becomes effective upon promulga-
tion; 443 the amendment gave no guidance as to the effective date
of a design or practice standard. The ninety-day grace period for
existing sources applies only to an "emission standard," 444 and
so do the provisions for waiver to install controls 45 or for national
security.440 Delegation of enforcement authority to a state covers
only "emission standards," 447 as does the rulemaking procedure
prescribed under section 307(d).448 None of this could have been
calculated; there was no conceivable reason for treating design and
practice standards differently from numerical standards in any of
these respects.
Legislative history shows conclusively that the failure to amend
these various provisions was sheer accident. The Senate bill would
have amended all of them in a single stroke by giving a broad
definition to "emission standard": "[T]he Administrator may prom-
ulgate a hazardous emission standard in terms of a design, equip-
ment, or operational standard . . . ." 49 The Conference slightly
expanded the circumstances in which design standards would be per-
missible and made "minor clarifying modifications in the language"
without expressing dissatisfaction with the obvious intention to
amend all references to section 112 "emission standards." 450 One
of those "minor clarifying modifications" was to express the design
provision as an additional authorization rather than as a defini-
tion.451 There is no sign that anybody thought this stylistic altera-
tion made any substantive difference.
443 See 42 U.S.C. §7412(b)(1)(C) (Supp. 11 1978).
4441d. § 7412(c) (1) (B) (i).
445 Id. § 7412(c)(1)(B)(ii).
44GSee id. § 7412(c)(2).
4471Id. § 7412(d) (i).
4481d. § 760y7(d)(1)(C).
449 See S. REP'. No. 127, supra note 428, at 163.
450 H.R. REP. No. 564, supra note 221, at 131-32, reprinted in [1977] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs at 1511-13.
451 Congress did add to § 302 a general definition of "emission limitation"
or "emission standard" that might possibly be construed to embrace provisions
like that struck down in Adamo: "a requirement .. .which limits the quantity,
rate, or concentration of emissions of air pollutants on a continuous basis, including
any requirement relating to the operation or maintenance of a source to assure
continuous emission reduction." 42 U.S.C. § 7602(k) (Supp. H 1978). The
legislative history does not explain the effect of this definition. The final clause
was added in conference, and the explanation merely paraphrases the statute. See
H.R. REP. No. 564, supra note 221, at 172, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws at 1553. Because the amendment does not use the § 112 terms
"design, equipment, [or] work practice," however, it seems likely it was meant
only to authorize requirements for the proper maintenance and operation of
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Happily, Congress corrected its oversight in 1978, amending
section 112 yet again to provide that "[a]ny design, equipment, work
practice, or operational standard . . . shall be treated as an emis-
sion standard for purposes of this chapter." 452 It appears that the
inflexibility of section 112 has at last been remedied.
B. "To Protect the Public Health"
Section 112(b)(1)(B) requires the Administrator to set emission
standards for hazardous pollutants "at the level which in his judg-
ment provides an ample margin of safety to protect the public
health," and section 112(e)(1) establishes the same criterion for
design or operation standards.453 This phrasing raises important
issues of interpretation and of policy.
The first issue is the apparently absolute nature of the require-
ment that standards provide "an ample margin of safety to protect
the public health." This seems to say that health must be protected
without regard to cost.454 In connection with air-quality standards
under section 109, which uses virtually the same language,455 I have
criticized the evident congressional determination that the last
sneeze must be eliminated even if it doubles the national debt to
do so.456 I have argued that the Occupational Safety and Health
Act, which requires standards "to provide safe or healthful employ-
ment," 457 need not be construed to outlaw "all work in mines, on
tall buildings, or in putting out fires"; 458 but that statute contains
the flexible prefix "reasonably necessary or appropriate." 459 Section
112(b) contains no such modifier; it appears to make cost irrelevant.
Nevertheless the Administrator explicitly took cost into account
under section 112 in revising his proposed asbestos standard so as to
avoid putting an end to the demolition business,460 and in allowing
emission-control devices, as the regulations required in connection with new-source
performance standards under § 111. See 40 C.F.R. § 60.11(d) (1979).
452 Health Service Research, Health Statistics, and Health Care Technology
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-623, § 13(b), 92 Stat. 3458 (to be codified in 42
U.S.C. §7412(e)(5)). Section 13(a) of the same Act makes a similar provision
respecting "standard of performance" in § 111.
45342 U.S.C. §7412(b)(1)(B), (e)(1) (Supp. H 1978).
454 Accord, W. RoDGERs, ENVmONMENTAL LAw 277 (1977).
45542 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (1) (Supp. II 1978): "[Standards the attainment and
maintenance of which in the judgment of the Administrator, . . . allowing an
adequate margin of safety, are requisite to protect the public health.")
456 See Federal Air-Quality Standards, supra note 7, at 366-69.
45729 U.S.C. §652(8) (1976).
45 8 Currie, OSHA, 1976 Am. B.F. REs. J. 1107, 1134.
45929 U.S.C. § 652(8) (1976). See American Petroleum Inst. v. OSHA, 581
F.2d 493, 502 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 440 U.S. 906 (1979).
46o See text accompanying notes 406-09 supra.
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demolition to take place without wetting when it is being under-
taken at subfreezing temperatures, because "worker safety would be
unduly jeopardized by the unsafe footing caused by ice forma-
tion." 461 In proposing the vinyl-chloride standard the EPA frankly
rejected the suggestion that section 112 required absolute protection.
Although finding that no level of exposure to vinyl chloride was
safe, the Agency observed that to outlaw all emissions would shut
down an important industry, and it construed the statute to
authorize
emission standards that require emission reduction to the
lowest level achievable by use of the best available control
technology in cases involving apparent non-threshold pol-
lutants, where complete emission prohibition would result
in widespread industry closure and EPA has determined
that the cost of such closure would be grossly dispropor-
tionate to the benefits of removing the risk that would
remain after imposition of the best available control
technology.462
The EPA has thus deftly equated section 112's requirement of
"an ample margin of safety to protect the public health" with
section 111's requirement of best technology considering cost.
While Congress ought to have allowed costs to be taken into ac-
count, the EPA has taken excessive liberties; the difference between
health standards and technology standards is too obvious to be ex-
plained away as accidental.463 The best chance for allowing cost to
be considered under section 112 is to argue that to "protect the
public health" means to afford reasonable protection in light of
cost,4 4 but, as Professor Gelpe has concluded, Congress seems to
46140 Fed. Reg. 48,295 (1975). See National Ass'n of Demolition Con-
tractors v. Costle, 565 F.2d 748 (D.C. Cir. 1977), upholding the Administrator's
refusal to extend the exemption to above-freezing temperatures. "Protection of
the public ... may necessitate use of different control measures ... in different
conditions." Id. 753.
46240 Fed. Beg. 59,534 (1975). As adopted, the corresponding regulation
was based on best available technology. 41 Fed. Reg. 46,560-62 (1976). In
settlement of a suit challenging the regulation, the EPA agreed to modifications,
including a zero-discharge "goal" but without abandoning the cost-benefit prin-
ciple. See Gelpe, Regulation of "Hazardous" Air Pollutants (1980) (unpub-
lished manuscript on file with the author). Similarly, in revising its demolition
standard for asbestos the EPA had said its regulations were "based on the use of
the best available emission control methods." 40 Fed. Beg. 48,295 (1975).
463 The EPA similarly managed to take practicability into account in regu-
lating "toxic!' water pollutants, despite the similarly absolate health requirement
of a former version of the Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (1976)
(amended 1977). See La Pierre, Technology-Forcing and Federal Environmental
Protection Statutes, 62 IowA L. RE~v. 771, 798-805 (1977).
414 See Currie, supra note 458, at 1134.
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have reached the uninformed conclusion that the benefits of pro-
tection from "hazardous" pollutants invariably exceed the costs.
465
Second, whether or not health protection is to be absolute, an
interesting challenge to administrative ingenuity is posed by the
requirement that "emission standards" be set "at the level . . . to
protect public health." 466 This formulation is easily comprehended
in the case of ambient standards, for it demands that the air we
breathe be safe for the purpose. Section 112, however, requires that
standards governing discharge be set to accomplish that end. It
should be evident that no uniform emission standard is likely to
assure that the ambient air is safe to breathe everywhere unless it
requires the discharge to be clean enough to breathe as it emerges
from the smokestack. This is because the harmfulness of a given
discharge varies according to numerous factors: other nearby sources
of the same or other pollutants, topographical and meteorological
conditions affecting the dispersal of emissions, the height of the
smokestack, and the proximity of people to be adversely affected.
One way out of this difficulty is to punt, as was done in the case
of beryllium, by setting an air-quality standard rather than an emis-
sion standard: emissions shall not cause ambient levels in the vicinity
of the source to exceed 0.01 Rtg/m 5 (thirty-day average),4 7 a level
found to be of no danger to public health.468  The legality of this
approach seems highly doubtful in light of Adamo, for the statute
still authorizes only "emissions standard[s]" and "design, equip-
ment, work practice, or operational standard[s]." 469 An alternative
beryllium standard is phrased in terms of emissions: beryllium emis-
sions are not to exceed ten grams in a twenty-four-hour period 47 0
because "[t]his level was determined through dispersion estimates
as the level which would protect against the occurrence of thirty-day
average ambient concentrations exceeding 0.01 jig/m." ' 471 I fail to
see how this conclusion can be reached without regard for the par-
ticular conditions of each plant subject to the regulation.
465 See Gelpe, supra note 462. The District of Columbia Circuit has held
that the Administrator need not, and strongly suggested that he may not, consider
feasibility or cost under a similar, former version of the "toxic" pollutants pro-
vision of the Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1317 (1976) (amended
1977). Hercules, Inc. v. EPA, 598 F.2d 91, 110-14 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
466 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b)(1)(B) (Supp. II 1978).
467 40 C.F.R. § 61.32(b) (1979).
468 38 Fed. Reg. 8,823 (1973).
46942 U.S.C. §7412(b)(1)(B) (Supp. H 1978).
47040 C.F.R. § 61.32(a) (1979).
471 Id.
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For asbestos the problem was complicated by the absence of
information as to dangerous ambient concentrations. Concluding
that cases of illness in the neighborhood of asbestos sources had
occurred only at concentrations which were "high by comparison
with most community air," the EPA, without further explanation,
forbade visible asbestos emissions from specified sources, but alter-
natively provided that compliance could be achieved by using a good
baghouse.4 72 Again, it seems somewhat uncertain whether either
formula would suffice to protect public health without regard to
such considerations as the concatenation of a number of similar
sources.
The statutory requirement of absolute health protection
through source controls ought to be modified. The Agency should
be authorized to take cost into consideration under section 112(b).
Additionally, Congress should make a choice between the two con-
flicting principles it has sought to combine in section 112, for
varying conditions make it impossible to achieve a uniform level
of health protection through uniform emission standards.
III. THE STRATOSPHE-RE
Finding that "halocarbon compounds introduced into the en-
vironment potentially threaten to reduce the concentration of ozone
in the stratosphere," that "ozone reduction will lead to increased
incidence of solar ultraviolet radiation at the surface of the Earth,"
and that "increased ... radiation is likely to cause increased rates
of disease in humans (including . .. skin cancer), threaten food
crops, and otherwise damage the natural environment," 473 Con-
gress in 1977 added to the Clean Air Act a new Part B intended
to fill gaps in information 474 and in regulatory authority 475 re-
specting damage to the stratosphere. The heart of Part B is section
157(b), which directs the Administrator of the EPA, upon comple-
tion of a two-year study,4 76 to promulgate "regulations for the
control of any substance, practice, process, or activity . . . which in
his judgment may reasonably be anticipated to affect the strato-
sphere, especially ozone in the stratosphere, if such effect in the
47240 C.F.R. §61.22(a), (c), and () (1979); see 38 Fed. Reg. 8,820-22
(1973).
47342 U.S.C. § 7451(a)(1)-(3) (Supp. II 1978).
474 Id. §.7450.
475 H.R. REP. No. 564, supra note 221, at 148, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 1528.
476 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 7455, 7457(b) (Supp. H 1978).
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stratosphere may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare." 477
In broadly authorizing regulations to "control" substances or
activities that may harm the stratosphere, Congress has avoided the
risk of narrow construction inherent in such terms as "emission
standard" or "standard of performance," as illustrated by the Su-
preme Court's decision in Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States.
478
Rather, the language is similar to that respecting control of vehicle
fuels in section 211 (c)(1).479 The House Report attempted to em-
phasize the broad range of options included: "'controls' may in-
clude design standards, work practice standards, prohibitions,
and/or such other measures as may be necessary to assure protection
for health and environment and to protect the stratosphere." 480
The question may arise, as it did in connection with fuels,4 1
whether a requirement that nonpolluting substitutes be made
available qualifies as a means of "control[ling]" harmful substances;
the District of Columbia Circuit's affirmative holding in Amoco
Oil Co. v. EPA 482 under section 211 (c)(1) seems fully in line with
Congress's explicit intention to convey a complete arsenal of regu-
latory techniques.
In allowing regulation to prevent effects that "may reasonably
be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare," Congress
embraced, as it did in various other provisions, the sweeping pre-
cautionary approach taken by the en banc decision in Ethyl Corp.
v. EPA.4s3 As the House Report stated:
[T]he Administrator need not produce rigorous evidence
of deleterious health effects due to ozone depletion, nor
need he refute every hypothesis counter to the chemical
models predicting ozone depletion .... It is sufficient that
the Administrator rely upon reputable scientific and medi-
477Id. §7457(b). The procedures of §307(d) must be followed. Id.
§7607(d)(1)(H). The authority to revise regulations is explicit in §157(b).
See id. § 7457(b).
478434 U.S. 275 (1978). For a discussion of this case, see text accompanying
notes 410-52 supra.
47942 U.S.C. §7545(c)(1) (Supp. H 1978). See Mobile-Source Provisions,
supra note 7, at 881-84.
480 H.R. REP. No. 294, supra note 17, at 102 n.2, reprinted in [1977] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 1181 n.2.
481 See Mobile-Source Provisions, supra note 7, at 883-84.
482501 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
4 8
3 See text accompanying note 69 supra; H.R. REP. No. 294, supra note 17,
at 49, reprinted in [19771 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 1127.
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cal data and measurements from both the laboratory and
the field to establish reasonable anticipation of harm.4s
Sensibly, section 157(b) requires the Administrator, when
promulgating standards to protect the stratosphere, to "take into
account the feasibility and the costs of achieving such control." 485
The House Report explains that awareness of costs is "necessary
. . . in determining what combination of stratospheric protection
measures are most appropriate." 4s0 The Report cautions, how-
ever, that neither a cost-benefit analysis nor a social impact state-
ment need be prepared; "[w]hat is required ... is the same kind of
analysis of costs and feasibility which must be undertaken in the
development of new source standards of performance under section
111(b) of the Act. See Portland Cement Ass'n v. Ruckelhaus [sic].
S. .,, 487 Moreover, the Report adds that, because "regulations...
are to be based upon the degree of control necessary for strato-
spheric protection and for protection of health and environment,"
"[s]tratospheric protection measures are not confined to use of the
best control technology or to requiring compliance with techno-
logically feasible emission limitations." 488
Unfortunately, this explanation may not speak with a single
voice. The first sentence quoted appears to say that "health and
environment" must be given absolute protection regardless of
cost, which would contravene the clear statutory command that cost
be taken into account. The Committee was right, however, in
pointing out that a requirement that technology and cost be con-
sidered need not limit the Agency to available technology if the
need for additional protection is sufficiently great.
In case the Administrator finds a need to regulate before the
prescribed study is completed, section 157(a) directs him to do
so.489 The threshold requirement for regulation is the same before
as after the report is filed: reasonable anticipation of stratospheric
effect "reasonably . . . anticipated to endanger public health or
welfare." 490 The House Report, however, suggests that premature
regulation was to be undertaken only in special circumstances:
"the Administrator should balance the anticipated benefits of com-
484 Id. 100, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 1178 (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 575, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1977)).
48542 U.S.C. §7457(b) (Supp. H 1978).
486 H.R. REn. No. 294, supra note 17, at 101, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 1180.
487 Id. 102, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CoNG. & AD. NEws at 1180.
488 Id. n.2, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1181.
48942 U.S.C. §7457(a) (Supp. 11 1978).
490Id. §§7457(a), (b).
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pleting the authorized studies against the risks to public health and
environment which may result from delaying a decision . *.".." 491
The Report goes on to enumerate in detail factors relevant to this
determination, further supporting the notion that premature regu-
lation is to be undertaken cautiously.
492
Enforcement of the stratospheric regulations is carried out by
the machinery of section 113,493 except that administrative orders
are not authorized,494 and by citizen suit under section 304.495 In
keeping with the intention that Part B "fill regulatory gaps" and
not "supersede" existing authority,496 section 158 provides that
"[n]othing in this part shall be construed to alter or affect the
authority of the Administrator under other sections of the Act" or
of "any other department, agency, or instrumentality of the United
States under any other provision of law" respecting stratospheric
protection.49
7
As is increasingly common, section 159 contains a provision
preempting state law. It is relatively mild: states are ousted from
regulation only after a federal regulation "is in effect" for the "risk"
in question.498 Even then the state may guard against inadequate
federal enforcement by implementing a regulation "identical" to
the federal,499 and there is no preemption of "any law or regulation
of any State or political subdivision controlling the use of halo-
carbons as propellants in aerosol spray containers." 500
IV. EMERGENCY POWERS
The final provision for direct federal authority to abate station-
ary-source pollution is section 303(a), which empowers the Admin-
istrator to seek appropriate relief in federal court against "an immi-
491 H.R. REP. No. 294, supra note 17, at 101, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws at 1179.
492 Id.
49342 U.S.C. § 7413 (Supp. II 1978).
494 See id. §§ 7413(b) (3) (civil actions), 7413(c) (1) (D) (criminal actions).
49542 U.S.C. §7604(a)(1), (f)(3) (Supp. 111 978).
496 H.R. REP. No. 564, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 148, reprinted in [1977] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1529.
49742 U.S.C. § 7458 (Supp. II 1978). Another clause of the same section
preserves any rulemaking proceeding under the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 2601-2629 (1976), begun prior to the enactment of the provisions relating
to the stratosphere, despite a provision in such Act making it generally inapplicable
when other statutes provide regulatory authority. See H.R. REP. No. 564, supra
note 496. For a discussion of the stratosphere-related regulatory authority of
agencies other than the EPA, see S. REP. No. 127, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 63-64
(1977).
49842 U.S.C. §7459(b) (Supp. II 1978).
499 Id.
500 Id.
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nent and substantial endangerment to the health of persons." 501
This provision was adopted in 1967 for the deserving purpose of
avoiding "disaster episodes such as occurred in the heavily indus-
trialized Meuse Valley in Belgium in 1930; in Donora, Pa., in 1948;
in New York City in 1953; and in London in 1952 and 1962," 502
and was initially viewed as a temporary measure needed only be-
cause of "the necessary passage of time . . .prior to establishment
of enforcible [sic] standards" under other portions of the Act.
0 3 It
has, however, properly become a permanent safeguard against crises
that somehow elude the normal regulatory process.
Section 303 is as broad as its underlying need, for it allows
action to be taken against any pollutant from any source, whether
stationary or mobile, and it was amended in 1977 to authorize
temporary administrative abatement orders "[i]f it is not practicable
to assure prompt protection of the health of persons solely by com-
mencement of . . . a civil action." 604 Appropriately, given the
severity of the health threat against which section 303 was to be
used, the 1967 House Report observed that "the Secretary may ob-
tain the necessary injunction regardless of technological and eco-
nomic feasibility." 505 This should not be read to mean that the
adverse effects of an injunction must in all cases be ignored. On
the other hand, because it conveys such a potentially drastic and
unlimited authority, section 303 does not apply unless health is
seriously endangered. It does not reach, for example, imminent
danger to crops, unless, perhaps, the threatened crop is essential
enough that its loss would endanger human health. In theory some
broadening of the criteria for emergency action might be desirable;
in practice it seems likely that any air pollution so severe as to pose
a serious threat to public welfare will also substantially endanger
public health.
501 Id. § 7603(a).
502 H.R. RB_. No. 728, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 19 (1967).
503 Id.
50442 U.S.C. § 7603(a) (Supp. H1 1978). For an explanation of the change,
see H.R. REP. No. 294, supra note 17, at 327-29, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CoNG. & An. NEws at 1406-08.
The constitutionality of postponing a hearing until after the order is issued
seems assured in such an emergency. See Commissioner v. Shapiro, 424 U.S. 614
(1976) (absconding taxpayer) (dictum); North Am. Storage Co. v. Chicago,
211 U.S. 306 (1908) (contaminated food). The order expires within 24 hours
unless an action is ified, and then within 48 hours unless extended by the court.
42 U.S.C. § 7603(a) (Supp. II 1978). But see the argument in Rendleman, Legal
Anatomy of an Air Pollution Emergency, 2 ExvT'. AFF. 90 (1972), that the EPA
should be careful to comply with the provisions of FED. R. Crv. P. 65(b) respecting
notice and that the statute should be amended to provide compensation in the
event of an erroneous order.
505 H.R. REP. No. 728, supra note 502, at 19.
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The traditional deference to state authority is observed. Suit
is to be brought only if "State and local authorities have not acted
to abate such sources," and consultation with state and local author-
ities is required "prior to taking any action under this section." 150
The House Report in 1977 endorsed the common-sense view that
ineffective state action does not preclude federal suit under the
former proviso.507 On the other hand, the House Committee also
said that one occasion for the use of the new Administrative author-
ity might be "emergency situations caused by automobile-related
pollution, where the only effective method of protection . . may
. . .be . . . to require municipal officials to restrict or prohibit
traffic." 508 This may be taken as sufficient indication that section
303 should be read to authorize orders requiring state and local
officers to regulate traffic, thus provoking a serious constitutional
question which I have discussed in another context 09
Section 303(b) provides for civil penalties of up to $5,000 per
day for "willful" violation of an order of the Administrator under
section 303(a).510 Though the statute is silent as to the issues open
in an action to recover penalties, the House Report explains that in
such action "the defendant may obtain review of the validity of the
Administrator's order, as well as raise factual defenses that the vio-
lation did not occur or that it was not willful." 511 This is no more
than what the Constitution requires, because there is no statutory
requirement of a prior opportunity to challenge the issuance of
the order.5
12
V. CONCLUSION
Even apart from the separate provisions for motor vehicles and
for a dominant federal role in the implementation of ambient
50642 U.S.C. § 7603(a) (Supp. II 1978).
507 H.R. REP. No. 294, supra note 17, at 327 n.10, reprinted in [1977] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1406.
50s8d. 327-28, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1406-07.
509 Federal Air-Quality Standards, supra note 7, at 390-91.
51042 U.S.C. § 7603(b) (Supp. H 1978).
511 H.R. REP. No. 294, supra note 17, at 328, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & An. NEWS at 1407.
51 2 See Federal Air-Quality Standards, supra note 7, at 403. Section 303 has
been invoked once, in Birmingham in 1971. According to the House Report,
efforts by the county health officials to request voluntary emission
reductions by 23 major sources during the early stages of the episode
met with uneven results, at best. Effective action to reduce emissions
at all major sources did not occur until the temporary restraining order
was issued under section 303.
H.R. REP. No. 294, supra note 17, at 327, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws at 1406 (footnote omitted). For a detailed discussion of the
Birmingham episode, see Rendleman, supra note 504, at 90; Walpole, Another
Look at the Air Pollution Crisis in Birmingham, 3 ENVT'L AFr. 243 (1974).
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standards, the various grants of authority considered in this Article
render quite hollow the statutory catechism that pollution control
is primarily a state responsibility. In an emergency the federal
courts may enjoin any contributing polluter. At all times the EPA
must directly regulate significant new sources, stratospheric con-
taminants, and all sources of "hazardous" pollutants not subject to
ambient standards. Finally, the long-dormant section 111(d) renders
even the limitation to new sources or hazardous pollutants more
apparent than real, because it authorizes regulation of all significant
emissions from existing stationary sources not already addressed by
air-quality standards.
Thus at first glance it may seem that the sacred cow of defer-
ence to the states has resulted not in a substantial limitation of
federal power, but rather in a deceptive patchwork that risks both
confusion and arbitrary gaps in federal coverage without giving real
protection to state interests. In theory the growth of federal power
may be cause for lamentation, for in the dispersal of authority lies
protection against abuse. But the sad lesson of the past, confirming
the dangers of interstate competition to attract businesses, has been
that the alternative to federal regulation is ineffective regulation.
It therefore may seem appropriate not that federal authority be
curtailed, but that the fiction of state primacy be abandoned in
order to permit rationalization of the federal program.
Separate statutory criteria for new sources, for "hazardous" pol-
lutants, and for existing sources under section 111 (d), the argument
would run, complicate the statute and require arid line-drawing
exercises with no sufficient justification. Whether a source is new
or a pollutant especially hazardous should be a relevant factor for
EPA consideration in setting standards for all sources under a single
test requiring a comparison of costs and benefits. The statute
should not take a dogmatic position respecting the desirability of
uniform national standards. It should permit technology forcing
by allowing a compliance date to be set in the future. It should
neither prescribe particular means of achieving compliance nor
limit the Agency's choice in determining the appropriateness of
setting ambient standards.
Far from moving in the direction of a simplified federal pro-
gram, the 1977 amendments not only complicate the new-source
section itself but add provisions that both create further complexi-
ties and bid fair to reduce the section 111 standards to a largely
academic exercise. The amendments effectively divide the country
into two categories: those areas in which the ambient standards are
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met and those in which they are not. The former are subject under
Part C to new requirements to prevent "significant deteriora-
tion," 513 the latter to the "nonattainment" requirements of Part
D.514 Major new sources in clean areas must utilize "the best avail-
able control technology," 515 and those in nonattainment areas must
comply with "the lowest achievable emission rate." 510 In either
case the standard may not be less but may be more stringent than
that required by section 111.517 Thus section 111 standards are not
determinative anywhere in the country with respect to pollutants
regulated under the deterioration and nonattainment provisions. 518
Some room for the operation of section 111 remains because
the new provisions apply only to "major" sources, and because they
may not cover all pollutants for which section 111 standards are
adopted. As I have argued in connection with the nonattainment
and deterioration requirements,519 it is debatable whether, especially
in the latter case, the marginal gains justify the additional admin-
istrative costs of three differing requirements in the same statute for
new-source standards.
Nevertheless, the simplifying suggestions I have made are sub-
ject to important reservations. The cumbersome implementation-
plan provisions, while assuring federal control over ambient con-
centrations and thus diminishing interstate competition to attract
polluters, give the states a dominant voice in determining what
measures to take to achieve those ends in situations in which there
are multiple options. The added administrative costs may be a
tolerable price to pay for avoiding unnecessary aggrandizement of
federal power at the expense of local self-determination. Moreover,
in general my concerns are more cosmetic than substantive. Like
the motor-vehicle provisions, the charter of other direct federal
powers is untidy but still basically adequate to support a vigorous
program, and, despite its tendency to give insufficient weight to cost,
it has so far been administered so as to avoid catastrophic over-
regulation.
513 42 U.S.C. §§ 7470-7491 (Supp. II 1978).
514 Id. §§ 7501-7508.
515 Id. § 7475(a)(4).
516Id. §§7502(b)(6), 7503(2).
517Id. §§ 7479(3), 7501(3).
518The EPA has recognized this in connection with adopting section 111
standards for particulate emissions from lime manufacturing plants. See 43 Fed.
Reg. 9,452-53 (1978).
519 Nondegradation, supra note 7, at 63; Relaxation of Implementation Plans,
supra note 7, at 240-42.
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